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ABSTRACT 
 
 In 2016, a collection of previously unreleased audio-recorded interviews and 
dialogues with phenomenological philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty were transcribed 
and published in French in Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier: et autres dialogues, 
1946-1959. Here, to my knowledge, I have translated three of those interviews into 
English for the very first time. Given that these interviews were recorded for broadcast to 
the general public, they provide an accessible entry point into some of the thoughts of 
Merleau-Ponty. The first interview that I have translated is Merleau-Ponty explaining his 
research in Philosophy. The second interview discusses Husserl, the concept of lived 
experience, and the discipline of phenomenology. The third interview is about praxis and 
how philosophy is engaged in the world. Following the three interviews is an original 
essay expanding upon some of the concepts introduced in the interviews, especially those 
in conversation with Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception.  
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PREFACE 
 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty gave a series of twelve interviews with French radio 
producer Georges Charbonnier throughout 1959. These interviews, along with many 
earlier interviews, were transcribed and compiled into the book Entretiens avec Georges 
Charbonnier: et autres dialogues, 1946-1959 (2016) by the editor Jérôme Melançon. I 
have chosen three pieces to translate as part of this thesis. To the best of my knowledge, 
there have been no previous translations of these interviews into English. My translations 
were done solely on the basis of these published transcriptions and with the notable help 
of my French advisor, Frédéric Rondeau, and with further proofreading from my 
philosophy advisor, Kirsten Jacobson. 
 The majority of the interviews found in Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier 
focus on contemporary political issues, presumably as they were meant to reach the 
general French public. The earliest interviews in the collection take place just after the 
end of World War II, broadcast on May 29, 1946, and even the later interviews are not far 
removed from this traumatic event in world history. Following WWII, France entered 
into a period that would come to be known as Les Trente Glorieuse (‘The Glorious 
Thirty’) in which the country experienced unprecedented economic growth. At the same 
time, the Cold War emerged as a major paradigm in international politics, and France (as 
a founding member of NATO) found a tense place in the world as a nuclear-armed nation 
near the also nuclear-armed USSR. Questions of war and politics were on the minds of 
many, and public intellectuals from diverse backgrounds found themselves discussing the 
various implications of political issues. As a result, many of the interviews conducted in 
 
 2   
this collection are on subjects outside of philosophy, ranging from Guallism to 
psychology. Given my academic and personal interests, I have selected three interviews 
to translate that relate most directly to the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
The first interview that I translated, conducted by André Parinaud, was broadcast 
on French radio on December 21, 1952. The introductory note is a translation of 
Melançon’s presentation of the interview. When it comes to the interviews with Georges 
Charbonnier, which make up the majority of the book, the recording dates are not clear, 
as Melançon compiled these interviews from the National Audiovisual Institute of France 
(Institut national de l’audiovisuel), which has several versions of the interviews with only 
the date of broadcast noted. That said, it is known that these interviews were conducted 
largely throughout the spring of 1959, and the interview on phenomenology took place 
around the centennial anniversary of Edmund Husserl’s birth, recorded days later, on 
April 15, 1959.  In general, as Melançon notes in the preface to Entretiens avec Georges 
Charbonnier, whenever the date of the recording is unknown the interviews are presented 
in an order that the editor believed would facilitate ease of reading and continuity of 
ideas. As a result, the exact date of the third interview that I have translated is not known.  
 The translation of these interviews was an involved project that took place over 
several months. I have never attempted a translation before, let alone a translation of 
originally spoken word. With the invaluable help of Professor Frédéric Rondeau, who 
helped ensure the accuracy of the translation, I was able to produce a text that attempts to 
stay true to the original French as much as possible, making alterations only when 
necessary to carry the sense of Merleau-Ponty’s words into English. Professor Kirsten 
Jacobson also helped to ensure that the translation was clear to an outside reader who has 
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not read the original text. However, as with any translation, it can be difficult to reconcile 
the syntax of two languages, and French often allows for significantly longer sentences 
than English does. Furthermore, since the text is a transcription of an actual conversation, 
as opposed to the more polished work of published philosophy, sentences in this 
collection tend to be even longer. Moreover, since Merleau-Ponty is thinking on the spot 
and formulating his responses as he is talking, his sentences tend to have many asides and 
breaks in thought. For this same reason, I felt the need to translate more directly than I 
otherwise might, as the interview format gives us an insight into the way in which 
Merleau-Ponty thinks and allows us to hear his voice. Significant alterations to the 
original transcription would change this voice and would result in the loss of Merleau-
Ponty’s thought pattern. At the same time, alterations are necessary in the process of 
translation in order to produce a compelling and understandable text. For the most part, I 
kept the long sentences of Merleau-Ponty’s speech, but I did change a fair amount of 
punctuation, replacing commas with em dashes to mark asides, and even removing 
commas entirely. But since commas serve to mark small pauses in speech as well as a 
grammatical function, I made the decision to keep commas where they do not confuse the 
meaning of what is said.  
 The greatest strength of the interview format is that Merleau-Ponty is forced to 
explain his philosophy in very approachable and mostly simple terms. Furthermore, the 
connections between different themes are easier to see when laid out in a conversation. 
This can readily be seen in the first interview that I translated as Merleau-Ponty traces the 
development of his philosophy. In this interview, he is largely responding to the 
paradigm of mind-body dualism that is widespread in philosophy and most other 
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disciplines. In order to find the link between the mind and the body, Merleau-Ponty 
begins with an investigation of behaviorism, which leads him to the phenomenological 
discussion of perception. Our relation to the body is a logical next step, given the body’s 
role in perception. Merleau-Ponty next explores language, even calling it the phenomenal 
body of thought. He is finally brought to a discussion of art and other ensembles that 
contain non-logical senses. This interview took place just two years before the sudden 
death of Merleau-Ponty, and this final subject was not fully investigated before his 
untimely death. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty died with works very much underway—most 
notably, The Visible and the Invisible. This first interview I translated, as well as the 
conversation on phenomenology, will easily serve as an introduction to the philosophy of 
Merleau-Ponty, giving the reader a helpful overview of his thought that could prepare 
them to delve deeper into his more technical philosophical texts. 
 The strength of the interviews in presenting Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy clearly 
and simply simultaneously prohibits a more in-depth discussion of the themes that are 
touched on. Merleau-Ponty was not at liberty to discuss many of his technical concepts in 
depth given the audience and the format of an interview, instead giving only “brief pieces 
of information” (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 423). As such, I have attempted 
to expand in this thesis upon what is said in the interviews by delving into the more 
critical reflections found in his texts, especially The Phenomenology of Perception. I have 
chosen to work primarily through this text because it most directly and clearly discusses 
the primary themes mentioned in the interviews: perception, the body, language, pre-
reflective consciousness and praxis. My writing is meant to make the connection between 
these subjects more explicit and to show the diverse ways in which they relate to each 
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other. I chose to end on the theme of praxis because this seems to be the perfect 
development and application of the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty—namely, recognizing 
that well employed speech and language fundamentally change the way our world shows 
up to us and, thus, how we are called to respond and live. 
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INTERVIEW ONE: CRITIQUING MIND-BODY DUALISM 
 
Georges Charbonnier - Maurice Merleau-Ponty, can I ask you a question that might be 
meaningless? What is the meaning of your research in pure philosophy? 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty - The starting point of this research was at its heart rather 
traditional. I remember very well that, by the end of my studies, I had grown attached to 
the relationship between the mind and the body as an issue that particularly interested me. 
And, well, I continued in this direction for about fifteen years, and it’s the result of this 
effort that appeared in the form of two books, one on perception, the other on behavior, 
that were both - from two different dates, by the way, because there is an interval of six 
years between them - that were both dealing with the issue of the relationship between 
the mind and the body. Essentially, you see, what always struck me throughout all of my 
studies was that our teachers were for the most part Cartesians; a man like Léon 
Brunschvicg was a Cartesian, so he accepted a categorical distinction between mind and 
body, which was the distinction of what is consciousness and what is object, existence as 
object and existence as consciousness being in contradiction with each other like 
Descartes taught, as everyone knows.1 These philosophers didn’t see a problem. Every 
time that we observe in our experience - as Descartes avidly said we observed, by the 
way - a link between mind and body, these philosophers always tend to show that the 
link, when we reflect, does not persist. There is a link between my mind and my body 
since, for example, I perceive according to what happens in the outside world, according 
 
1 Merleau-Ponty uses the word “maîtres” here which is more inclusive than “teachers,” including 
philosophical influences as well as those who directly taught him. 
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to the action that external objects exert on my senses, and, in consequence, this 
demonstrates an effect of the body on the mind, and inversely, there is an effect of the 
mind on my body when I move, when I displace my body, but these issues, for thinkers 
formed by the school of Descartes and Kant, these phenomena are phenomena of a 
second order. As soon as the mind reflects on its real nature, it sees itself only as pure 
consciousness, thought in the Cartesian sense, and it is the mind itself that is again the 
spectator of the relationship between mind and body. It sees the relationship, thinks it, 
establishes it, this is a part of the universe of thought, but it isn’t a link between thought 
and anything else besides itself. And it’s this philosophical immanence of thought to 
itself that always shocked me, that always seemed insufficient to me. So, since the time 
of my studies, I intended to work on this problem of the relationship between the mind 
with what is not itself, how to make it understandable, how to make it thinkable. 
 So, I first did work on what the psychologists call behavior. This notion was 
especially widespread among American psychologists and Anglo-Saxons under the name 
behavior and it served first and foremost to designate a new object that these authors 
decided to give to psychology.2 Psychology had to be devoted to the human, but the 
human as seen from the outside. I see someone else in the middle of acting; I can study 
the relationship that exists between the situation in which the observed person finds 
himself and the responses that he gives to this situation and the situation-response 
relation; there you have behavior. Among the authors who were the first to introduce this 
notion, the intention was at its core to totally free psychology from all types of interior 
life. It was a question of taking the human as he appears to me, not when I consider 
 
2 The word “behavior” appears in English here. 
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myself reflectively, but when I see another man as he is thinking, speaking and acting, 
and behavior understood as such was therefore considered an exterior reality, almost 
material. For the American Watson, for example, behavior was considered in many 
respects as a chain of causes and effects that happened according to the outside world, 
that acted from my body to my mind, by the intermediary of nerves to my motor organs 
and my mechanical responses to the situation.  
 And, so, a strange development of this notion of behavior was produced. 
Essentially, we realized very quickly that it was twofold. On the one hand, it was a quasi-
materialist notion, since it assumes, as I was telling you a moment ago, the relationship of 
cause and effect between exterior events and the response that the living being gives to 
these events. But also, to the degree that we describe behaviors and that we classify them, 
we realize that these behaviors have different structures. And, so, even when we start, as 
Watson did, with the bias does not consider the interior, we see the interior reappear in 
the structure, the form, of behaviors. 
So, in a slightly more technical work (on which I can obviously only give brief 
pieces of information) I intended to identify exactly what this structure of behavior was 
and how it leads us to define the relationship between mind and body, of material and 
sense, this is what I did in this first work.3 And the second work, on perception, that I did, 
was essentially the same work, but this time taken more fully.4 Whereas in the first, I was 
concerned with this notion of behavior and I even tried to follow its development, or 
certain developments, in the second, on the other hand, I did not submit to considering 
 
3 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice.The Structure of Behavior. Translated by Alden L. Fisher. Beacon Press, 1963. 
4Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Translated Donald Landes. Routledge, 2014.  
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man from the outside, as one does in the psychological methodology of behavior, but I 
turned towards myself, but with the intention to seize in me what in certain regards is the 
least spiritual, the least pure thought, to understand perception. 
Perception - which is, as everyone knows, our apprehension of objects existing 
around us, and the relations between these objects - perception seemed to me to be an 
important subject to study, because it is here that the junction between body and mind is 
accomplished. Clearly my perception depends on corporeal conditions, there must be 
objects in order to see them or, in any case, certain well defined phenomena in my 
nervous system are necessary to have a hallucination; in short, the link between the mind 
and the body is visible here, and it was still my problem of mind and body and their 
relationship that reappeared in the form of the topic of perception. 
So here, I ran into the entire tradition, Cartesian as well, that analyzes our 
perception of the outside world by seeing in it an operation of the mind. You know, you 
remember the famous text in which Descartes analyzes a piece of wax and tries to show 
that when we reflect on it and when we try to remove what is firm and solid in the 
perception of a piece of wax, in the end, all of the sensible properties of the wax 
disappear, because none of them are totally essential to the object - the wax can change 
consistency, it can become liquid, it can change scent, it can change color, and it’s still 
the same wax - and what’s left to form the heart of the object is something that is 
understood by the intelligence or by the mind, by the inspection of the mind, says 
Descartes, to understand a certain portion of space, informed in this way or that and in 
different ways according to which the wax is solid or liquid, for example. But the 
characteristics that define the object are, in the end, characteristics that address our mind 
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and not our senses. Descartes’s text is very well known, and you will certainly remember, 
he more or less finishes with these words: “I realize that I understand by an inspection of 
the mind what I believed to see with my eyes.”5 We don’t see with our eyes, for 
Descartes, it isn’t the eye that sees, it’s the soul, he said. And, well, it’s this Cartesian 
analysis, passed on in the history of philosophy by all kinds of other works, other 
analyses, that I took for a topic of discussion and that I decided to discuss. 
I made use of a whole series of research that is known in Germany as the theory 
of form, or Gestalt theory, research whose common trait is the intention to describe what 
these authors call the form of the exterior world. And what they understood by form, it’s 
not simply the contour, the exterior form. It’s what we could more clearly call 
configuration. These authors, who started to write in Germany after 1918, and whose 
influence has since been considerable on the entirety of psychological and sociological 
literature, tried to give evidence in the name of form, or Gestalt, ensembles, organized 
ensembles. For example, a melody - a melody is an organized ensemble. It isn’t a sum of 
elements since you can change every element, the form remaining constant; what 
happens when you transpose a melody - however, although this is an ensemble, the 
meaning of this ensemble is not something that speaks to only our intelligence, it’s 
something quasi-sensible.6 
 
5 “I now know that even bodies are perceived not by the senses or by imagination but by the intellect alone, 
not through their being touched or seen but through their being understood” (Descartes, 30). 
6 Merleau-Ponty is explaining that Gestalt Theory deals with organized ensembles whose sense is not found 
through the investigation of the mind,as Descartes would arue. A melody clearly has a sense when taken as 
a whole, but we only can only investigate this sense through listening; the melody is to some degree 
sensible. 
 
 11   
And, so, what interested me in Gestalt theory, what still interests me, is this 
description of an order of sense and signification that is truly on the level of lived 
experience and that is not on the order of mind, in the Cartesian sense. I thought that I 
found here something that ensured the junction, the link between the properly sensible 
and the intelligence or judgement. And my work made an effort to completely clarify, to 
completely describe this concrete aspect of the relations as we perceive them, as opposed 
to the relations as we design them. 
This implies for that matter, and this is a good part of my work, an analysis of the 
role that our body plays in the perception of the outside world. I once again made use of a 
lot of other work here, work in psychology and psychopathology. It seemed to me that 
one could show that in large my body is not only, as everyone knows, the seat of a certain 
number of conditions that govern the appearance of my perception of red or green or 
blue, my body is not only cause in this sense, and even if I describe things as they happen 
inside of me, from my point of view, it is not at all necessary to say that my body is the 
cause of perceptions; but it is more so the intermediary between me and exterior objects 
and perception, it’s to be in relationship with objects and aspects of objects and of 
relations between objects by the intermediary of a body. In certain regards, the body - I 
was running into the Cartesian thesis here: it isn’t the eye that sees, it’s the soul, and I 
was trying to show that if it’s the eye that sees, but not the eye of the physiologist, not 
this eye we can hold under our microscope or under our scalpel, this completely material 
eye, but a certain function of sensing and perception that is not of the order of mind and 
that is not of the order of material body, of objective body. I was trying to show that there 
is a body that is not the objective body as biological science can ascertain by its exterior 
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measures, that there is a body which I called, after others, phenomenal body, the body as 
we experience it, as we live it, and that this body is not simply one of the mind’s objects, 
one of the objects it takes an interest in and that it considers from afar, that in a way our 
mind is situated in it, in an intimate relation with it, and that this body is the mediator of 
our relationships with the outside world. This is the general outline of these first 
philosophical essays that I published during and just after the war, and that have since 
brought me to other philosophical research oriented in the same way, but addressing what 
is above the perceptive level this time, above the level of simple perception. 
I mean that once we show, as I have tried to do, that to perceive - this is not to 
think, that it’s something else, once we have shown that the thinking subject of Descartes 
is linked to a body, and that this link with the body is not an accident for him, an exterior 
circumstance, but that this is his mode of insertion in the world; it then remains to 
understand how it can be that such an embodied subject, linked to a body, is at the same 
time capable of operations that are beyond the means of the body, because we can also 
think, we can perceive and we can also think, and there is not for us only one perceived 
world, there is the scientific world, there is the world of philosophy, there is the world of 
knowledge, in a general way, and so I have since grown attached to the analysis of this 
secondary framework of reality, of this secondary order of reality. 
In particular, this led me to the close study of language because I in no way see an 
exterior envelope of thought in language, or a kind of mnemonic tool for thought, as if 
thought wasn’t really concerned with the function of speech. I see in speech not a simple 
instrument, but I see more in it, in some ways, speech can be considered the actualization 
of thought. There are no thoughts that come to be actual, effective, to really capture 
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something, without the help of speech, whether it is a matter of audible speech or one of 
interior speech. And so what I am trying to do now at the level of language is an analysis 
in the same vein as those I attempted of perception and the sensible world: to make 
language appear as a kind of body for thought, in the active sense of the word “body,” 
and not simply as a, an exterior envelope as I was saying earlier, or the clothing that 
thought dons and through which it happens.7 So, to grasp what makes up - when we go 
from the order of the perceived world to the order of thought, which is also the order of 
culture, in a way every relationship is reversed. We perceive according to what is 
imposed upon us by given conditions, and in contrast it seems that at the level of 
language and speech, we are dealing with an active man and not simply a passive man. 
And however, this activity is constantly supported by - first, language has its own life, 
that is not exactly the life of thought, and so it’s the examination of these close 
relationships between language and thought that have kept me busy for many years. 
This leads me to study, in addition to everything that linguists could have told us 
about language, modes of expression that are not yet language or that are not language at 
all, even, but that might have the potential to make certain aspects of language clear to us 
that we would not grasp otherwise. I am thinking, for example, of painting or music, of 
which we can say that they have a signification. I am in no way making an allusion to the 
subject here, the subject about which the musician writes or of which the painter paints. 
I’m not thinking about the subject at all, but I’m thinking about what organizes the 
interior of a painting or a piece of music, which is certainly not an illusion, since this is 
 
7 Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on language from this time can be found in The Visible and the 
Invisible as well as in Signs. 
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what makes all of the elements of music, or all the elements of a painting have a 
relationship and contribute altogether to making a single work. So, what is this sense? 
From which order of description is it susceptible? What are its relations with the sense 
such as I think I have unveiled at the level of perceived objects? There is here a kind of 
family of significations. 
In any case, we are dealing with significations that are not logical significations. 
And what is the possible pathway from this prelogical signification, or metalogical, to the 
properly logical signification? What are the varied uses of language? Beside its everyday 
use there is also its more than significant use, which is that of poetry and literature - here 
is the order of problems with which I am now engaged. And the book I am currently 
working on tackles these problems. Only, in order to do so, it must take another look at 
and expand upon the first descriptions that I gave in my book on perception, and I was 
led, for reasons that would be a little long to explain, to reconsider the notion of nature, to 
which I was led by my first work, and it’s only after having done this preliminary 
clearing up that I came to the problem of logos, which is to say that of meaning such as it 
appears at the level of expressive activity of man, whether in artistic forms or in truly 
linguistic forms, to use Paulhan’s term. (Brief pause) 
That’s what I wanted to tell you, simply, I don’t know if you will be able to put 
that in the program. It’s simply to even out a little, to not… since we are speaking about, 
we spoke for a rather long time about politics and, as I told you, I wouldn’t want people 
to completely lose sight that this isn’t my focus, in the end, that my focus, it’s 
philosophy. So, I think it wouldn’t be bad to... 
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C. - Yes, yes, yes. And what’s more I might not directly use under… entirely in one 
program, and well I don’t know, it’s all to be seen… 
M.P. - Yes, yes, yes. 
C. - I have to listen again… 
(The recording ends here) 
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INTERVIEW TWO: PHENOMENOLOGY 
 
Georges Charbonnier - Maurice Merleau-Ponty, I also want to ask you this question: 
What is the relationship between the phenomenologist and lived experience?8 Does the 
phenomenologist attempt to explain lived experience, to summarize it, or does he attempt 
to recreate it? If he intends to recreate it, what sense must be given to the word 
“recreation”? As I understand it, the phenomenologist does not deal with lived experience 
as a scientist, his angle is different; and I wonder if phenomenology is not going to be, in 
a certain way, like the approach of the artist towards his object? 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty - This theme of lived experience appears very early in Husserl. 
I was saying earlier that, at the beginning of phenomenology, we find themes that do not 
seem to go together. And here is an example; you’re giving me an excellent example. 
Since the beginning of phenomenology, there has been a desire to return to lived 
experience, and there is at the same time, as we were saying earlier, certain logical 
elements, and in one sense, they are at odds with each other. Is it a question, in 
phenomenology, of forming a chart of concepts or essences, which would be a logical 
approach, or of recreating lived experience. The two approaches seem to be completely 
different, almost opposites. 
 However, the fact is that from the beginning Husserl said that he wanted both. He 
wanted both. And that is what allowed me to say earlier that Husserl was never really a 
logician. He wanted to make a science of lived experience, and when we say “science,” 
 
8 I made the decision to translate “Vécu” as “lived experience”, since the original French word is both the 
past participle of the verb “vivre”, to live, and it is generally used as “experience.” “Lived experience” is 
also a technical term within the discipline of phenomenology. 
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we mean a rigorous exploration of lived experience; it obviously does not imply a 
science with the methodological apparatus that positive sciences make use of, that 
physics uses. 
C. - And the accuracy with which it aims. 
M.P. - The type of accuracy cannot be the same. However, it is certain that Husserl had 
the desire to retain the term science. As you know, the corresponding German term that 
Husserl uses, Wissenschaft, does not exactly have the same connotations as the French 
word “science.” In France, when we say “science,” it means science in a narrow sense. It 
signifies, in general, references to the experimental methods of science, or again to the 
mathematical apparatus of physics. Whereas when one says Wissenschaft in German, I 
believe at any time period, the term had a larger meaning. A scientific attitude, in the 
everyday language of the German academia, meant a rigorous attitude. And in this very 
large sense, then, philosophy can be a science without being so in the narrow sense. 
 So, I will close this digression, because the term that Husserl used shouldn’t be 
abused. Yes, he wrote that philosophy should be a strict science, or exact, or rigorous, but 
he never thought that it should be a science in the sense that physics is, that biology is, or 
even psychology. And, justly, this is because he was attached to lived experience straight 
away. And so, to the degree that he developed what must be understood by lived 
experience, we see his thought ripen. In one sense, he took lived experience to be 
everything. There are in Husserl, let’s take an example, analyses which perhaps made 
him most famous among the general public—analyses, concrete descriptions, that are, for 
example, about the role of the body, of my body. Husserl describes, attempts to show, 
that when we are perceiving something exterior, this is a sort of activity of our body, our 
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body viewed as a system of powers. He doesn’t analyze perception as we normally do, as 
an operation of the mind alone, as one does in the Cartesian tradition. He tries to show 
that there is an “I can,” a power, with which the body is equipped, a power of 
investigation, a power of exploration with regard to exterior objects, and that this 
motivating and carnal relation of my body with the object is a completely essential 
dimension of the thing perceived. There are many beautiful descriptions here that have 
made a place for an entire series of developments outside of the thought of Husserl and 
that are not descriptions of experience in the most habitual sense of the word, in the most 
concrete sense of the word. 
 Only this is a particular order of phenomenology for Husserl. It isn’t the entirety 
of phenomenology. And at the same time, then, he takes the consciousness of lived 
experience into consideration, which is to say a cumbersome consciousness, loaded with 
material, material in the largest sense of the word, I mean: the weight of our body, of our 
embodied experience. At the same time that he describes all of this, for him, it is an order 
of phenomenological description, but this isn’t all of phenomenology. And after 
describing all of that, it is a question of knowing how it is all done, how it is all formed. 
So, at the moment when the philosopher asks this question, he makes himself a pure 
spectator; the philosophical “I,”—I mean the philosophical ego, the subject of 
philosophy—truly arrives at its highest universality, and so it tries to understand how this 
network of concrete phenomena that was previously described is established. 
C. - But by understanding them internally. 
M.P. - By understanding them internally. The principle to which Husserl always held 
himself was that from the moment what we live is experienced by us and by our 
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consciousness, we have to be able, by examining this consciousness, to find the secret of 
everything that presents itself. How this is done, how this is constructed or composed. 
C. - In summary, it’s almost about contrasting a second, conscious experience from the 
first order lived experience. 
M.P. - Yes, what you are saying expresses exactly how things are presented when one 
reads Husserl. There are several degrees of lived experience. And well, what is 
captivating for me in the late works of Husserl, in the last ten years of his research, is that 
he increasingly noticed that between the two meanings of the word “experience” that we 
were just discussing; between experience in the primary sense, from an original 
perspective, and experience in the radical sense of philosophical consciousness, there is 
almost an incompatibility. And if we take experience in the second and radical sense that 
we are talking about, then the philosopher now has only one world, which is the world of 
his consciousness. And this is, if he performs this disconnection from others in the first 
place, because a universal consciousness such as this can’t really understand that there is 
another besides itself. Thus, this egology, as he said elsewhere, this radical reflection in 
which I am radically and absolutely alone, essentially doesn’t allow for the presence of 
other consciousnesses opposite ourselves. Yet others are phenomena, do appear to us; it 
is therefore necessary to understand how they are. Consequently, in the last ten years of 
his research, Husserl—I don’t think I am altering his doctrine by saying what I am going 
to say—has come to ask the question of knowing: is this attitude of reduction, of radical 
and total reflection, really possible? Or, if it is possible, does it not make certain themes 
that form a part of lived experience disappear, namely, others? 
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 The question is expressly posed in the very last writings, such as, for example, the 
work titled The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, which 
appeared fully in German for the first time just last year. This question is asked there. As 
such, you see, we have to consider the entire career of Husserl not at all as a straight 
development, but as an intensification of this theme of lived experience. You know that, 
for Plato, what’s characteristic of the philosopher is not to accept the alternatives, but to 
always want both. And, well, we could say that in this way Husserl was genuinely a 
philosopher. Because he wanted lived experience and he wanted rigor. And he always 
held both ends of the chain, and all of his philosophy, as time goes by, closely examines 
to an increasing degree how the two aspects can go together, how they are related, as they 
effectively are in our lives, which is at the same time a reflective life. 
C. - But for me, a non-philosopher, the connection between lived experience and rigor is 
called “art.” 
M.P. - I think that if one reflects upon the last meditations of Husserl, what you are 
saying there would not have displeased him. Because it is certain that speech…I am 
saying speech and not language because speech…it’s language in a living state, 
functioning and operant, and, well, speech plays a role in the last writings of Husserl—a 
fundamental role. 
(break) 
For example, he described, in his last unpublished fragments, which were written 
for himself rather than for the public, what he called sedimentation. He meant by this that 
a thought—that is always something transitive on its own, something that is a matter for 
an instant, thought in a pure sense, completely apart from its instrument of expression, a 
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flash, ultimately—this thought is sedimented. That is to say, with the help of language 
and through the medium of language, thought acquires a kind of stable existence. 
C. - That’s still the poetic ambition. 
M.P. - It is the poetic ambition. And this function of language is thus… language 
conveys what Husserl called idealisations. Idealisations are only possible by virtue of 
language and by the power that language has to sediment thoughts. 
 This means that language constitutes a kind of incomprehensible wonder in the 
sense that it results in marks written on paper, and these written marks on paper are 
capable, by themselves, to cause in another mind, sometimes centuries apart, the 
revival—the reactivation, Husserl said—of thoughts that originally were sedimented in 
this language. So, do you see at what point language becomes something fundamental? It 
conveys the entire world of thought. It subsumes everyone, it is the frame of ideas, it is 
the body or the frame of the mind. 
C. - I would maintain that it is truly a poetic ambition, but, however, philosophical 
expression by nature is not poetic. So, philosophical expression—philosophy—is it only 
the description of poetic ambition, of the movement towards poetry? When I say “only,” 
it's to restrict the question and not to diminish the role of philosophy. 
M.P. - Yes. The difference will always be that the poet employs speech—if you like, he 
is speech—and the philosopher wants to understand speech, understand this mysterious 
exercise. 
 Therefore here, as always, the philosopher takes a step back from the 
phenomenon to understand it and I’m not telling you that he succeeds in understanding it 
analytically. To understand, for philosophy, may not be to analyze. I believe that Husserl, 
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precisely—this is what is beautiful in the deepening of his thought—left an analytic; he 
attempted to create an analytic that was true to lived experience, but I wonder if, in the 
end, what he found really was an analytic. The evidence that he gives in his very last 
works would suggest that it wasn’t, and that, for example, with regard to language, it is 
impossible to explain or understand the exercise of speech. This fundamental exercise of 
speech that we were talking about earlier, it’s impossible to explain or understand as a 
combination of thoughts, of thoughts in a Cartesian sense, of distinct thoughts. There is a 
practice of speech that, in a manner of speaking, does more than is possible, that exceeds 
what is possible. And I believe that, in the last writings of Husserl, there is this very 
radical sentiment of effective realization, whether in the perceived world or the world of 
culture and the world of art, this realization of the impossible, which is the marvel of 
marvels. Only, this is not developed, it’s only indicated in certain sentences of his last 
writings. 
C. - But the impossible is precisely the territory of art in the most clear-cut way. I can 
only convey what I can’t say. 
M.P. - I don’t think Husserl would ever have accepted philosophy being reduced to 
literature. 
C. - Ah, that’s not what I was trying to say. Because the word “literature” has a pejorative 
meaning. 
M.P. - No, in the noble and high sense of the word “literature”—even in this sense, I 
don’t think Husserl would ever have accepted that thought can’t go beyond literary 
production and comprehension. 
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C. - I would never want to say that philosophy is being reduced to literature, because 
there is a point that is very simple to make: in the presence of a text, we know right away 
if it’s literature or philosophy. There is a coloration that does not deceive. 
M.P. - Yes. This isn’t totally true, at the same time, with regard to phenomenological 
texts, because one thing that struck the public, I believe, in this philosophy is that it often 
appears—I wouldn’t say literary, because as you are saying, the word has a pejorative 
meaning—but phenomenological expression often takes up phenomena and lived 
experience so directly that we feel like we get the same type of illumination that we do in 
literature. 
 I think that, said in another way, at the very end Husserl must have thought that 
philosophy, as far as it can’t happen without speech, is also necessarily restricted to 
certain limitations of fact. These aren’t limits that are placed once and for all, we can 
always move them back, shift them, but there are still some limits of fact that we talk 
about. Simply, I would say that the professional writer, that is, I mean he who decides to 
be a writer and not a philosopher, and, well, he dwells in language, language is his home, 
he sets himself up there, or again it’s his instrument, it’s an extension of his body and 
himself, whereas with the philosopher, faced with this obscure exercise of speech, there is 
always the will to understand speech itself, or in any case to describe with rigor what, in 
the interior of language, goes beyond the analytical intellect. 
C. - The gap that exists, the delay that exits between lived experience, on the one hand, 
and conscious experience, on the other, does this allow me to consider time? 
M.P. - Yes, you are touching an utterly essential point. One of the originalities of 
Husserl—a point on which we can reconcile with Bergson, which would be very time-
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consuming to do correctly because there are, in reality, very profound differences, but in 
the end the convergence on this point must still be mentioned—one of the originalities of 
Husserl was to admit that the philosophical consciousness, as radical as it may be, as pure 
as it tries to be, stays temporal; this is not, the philosopher is not someone who can, 
through the medium of reflection, dominate, hover over time. 
 In the lectures on the interior consciousness of time (which was published by 
Heidegger, but given by Husserl, of which Husserl is the author), there is precisely this 
very important idea that consciousness, as deeply as we enter into it, and even if we go to 
its center, is flux, it is absolute flux. Consequently, you see, I believe that this comes to 
support what I was saying earlier, that Husserl was not a logician, because a logician 
always tries to ensure us of an intellectual domination, an intellectual possession of time. 
Whereas Husserl recognized that consciousness is time. Not in the sense that the word 
has in everyday life, where time isn’t taken up from its source, but it is absolute flux. 
C. - I wanted to ask you another question, but it seems to me that everything you said 
completely answers it: I wanted to ask you if phenomenology is a philosophy or a 
method. It seems to me that following your remarks it’s both. But is it not appropriate in 
this case to give a rather particular meaning to the word “method”? Does the word 
“method” not change its meaning? 
M.P. - In truth, you know, method and doctrine, it’s rare that philosophers will separate 
them completely and if one wants - this may not be the most Cartesian way to proceed - 
one can concede that for Descartes, method is distinct from doctrine; he presents it as a 
relatively independent ensemble. But even with Descartes, it really is a question of 
knowing if the two things are independent, and among most philosophers, in any case, 
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they are not. Method is a glimpse of doctrine, and doctrine is the explanation of method. 
Just as, if you like, Bergson did not start by developing the method of intuition, but he 
started by grappling with an intuition, the intuition of duration; he confronted a certain 
type of being, he described duration, and he saw that the way in which we have access to 
duration could be, in a manner of speaking, generalized and could serve as a 
philosophical instrument, as a philosophical method; from there comes the concept of 
intuition, that he always said was very posterior, for him, to encountering duration. And, 
well, I believe that for all philosophers, it is a little like this. Their method is already the 
beginning of contact with the thing, the beginning of exploration of the world. 
 Regarding phenomenology, then, if we are speaking, in a somewhat vague way of 
the word, about the phenomenological method as description, in the sense that I was 
talking about it at first, in the sense that one can say that there is a phenomenological 
psychiatry, then, yes, we can distinguish method and doctrine, because it is here a 
question of research, which is not, properly speaking, philosophy. The doctor who treats 
a sick person in this frame of mind is in no way a phenomenologist in the sense of 
someone who strives to be, like the phenomenological philosopher does, or any 
philosopher. So, in this somewhat vague sense of the word “method,” it is certain that 
method and doctrine stay distinct in phenomenology. 
 But in reality, for Husserl, for example, this is what was valuable in his concrete 
studies -- which departed from the contemporary thought that he represented. What was 
meaningful in the end was his devotion to his central philosophical intuition, that is to 
say, to his willingness to investigate the significance of lived experience (vécu), at the 
level of lived experience (vécu) itself, through a kind of experience (expérience). The 
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word “expérience,” philosophy founded on experience, philosophy as an expression of an 
experience, this is again one of those Husserlian words with which we can reconcile 
certain Bergsonian words.9 
C. - Could we not also say that phenomenology is a description, maybe the first, of the 
philosophical process itself? I’m surprised that philosophers haven’t been 
phenomenologists, that they didn’t say so at least. But it seems to me that it is in the 
nature of philosophy itself to go towards the object. 
M.P. - That is to say that there could be an age of philosophy in which philosophy 
doesn’t examine itself; in truth, when we look at things closely, the philosopher is always 
the one who has wondered what philosophy is, and who wasn’t sure. And whoever spent 
his life trying to understand what philosophy is. So every great philosopher… 
C. - Which could even be the object of philosophy. 
M.P. - Which is the object of philosophy. If there is a discipline that puts itself in 
question and asks what it is, it’s philosophy. In this sense, in Plato as well as Husserl, 
there is a putting in question of philosophy by itself, and it is this self-examination that is 
philosophy. 
Only there may also have been times in which the connections between 
philosophy and lived experience, with historicity, with secular life, were less visible. It’s 
 
9 This passage is quite difficult to translate as Merleau-Ponty uses the word “expérience” for the first time 
in this interview in place of “vécu.” Both words can mean “experience” in general, although “vécu” seems 
to be used in a more technical sense as it relates to phenomenology, so I have translated it as “lived 
experience.” The word “expérience” is also the word for “experiment” in French, although Merleau-Ponty 
seems to be using this term in the general sense of “experience,” as opposed to “lived experience” which 
would be only a particular order of experience. There may be a play on the double meaning that gets lost 
translating it to either “experience” or “experiment.”  Here is the original French of the passage: “Ce qu’il y 
avait de valable tenait finalement à son intuition philosophique centrale, c’est-à-dire à cette volonté de 
chercher le sens du vécu, au niveau même du vécu, par une espèce d'expérience. Le mot d’« expérience », 
de philosophie fondée sur une expérience, philosophie comme expression d’une expérience…”  
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quite certain that there may have been a period of philosophical hubris in the history of 
thought. And Husserl, on the contrary, belonged to an age where not only did philosophy 
no longer have hubris, but—or maybe it had undergone, at the end of the nineteenth 
century, an entire series of affronts—in the end, it was reduced to nothing, it became the 
specialty of generalizations, it was almost a kind of rhetoric, it was burdened in any case 
with creating a superficial cohesion from the results of strictly independent disciplines 
like the sciences, it was emptied of its substance. And so the work of Husserl, like others, 
since 1900, had to demonstrate that philosophy didn’t really lose its meaning and its 
reality, but that it needed to reconstitute itself on the basis of experience, this as well; an 
experience that is not the maimed experience of the sciences, the partial experience of the 
sciences, but as a type of comprehensive unwinding of experience. And this is 
simultaneously true to the classic definition of philosophy, to the classic attitude… 
 
(The recording stops here) 
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INTERVIEW THREE: PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS 
 
 This program, hosted by André Parinaud, consists of three separate interviews 
where a question is posed first to Gabriel Marcel; then Merleau-Ponty; then Gaston 
Bachelard. Each one seems to be alone during the recording, there is no interaction 
between them. 
 
André Parinaud - My intention today is not to present an overview of the tendencies of 
contemporary philosophy, but more precisely, and more simply, to bring to the attention 
of three important contemporary philosophers some of the problems that interest thinkers 
in the diverse disciplines of thought and art. I now ask for the particular opinion of Mr. 
Merleau-Ponty, professor at the College of France, chair of philosophy. Mr. Merleau-
Ponty, is the notion of engagement, in your opinion, one of the original issues of current 
philosophy, or is it responding to a trend and transient form of intellectual and social 
evolution? 
M.P. - Well your question is embarrassing, because it is, I believe, full of 
misunderstandings, that are not your fault, of course, but that stem from the way in which 
the notion of engagement was introduced, I would say, in everyday use, and also in the 
manner in which one usually understands it. It is quite certain that if we take the word in 
the sense that those who first made use of it–namely, Mounier, in the past; in his 
magazine Esprit, since its beginning, and later Sartre; it was never a question in their 
minds of understanding engagement as an option between intellectual and political 
parties. If I wanted to give an anecdote, I could tell one about the founding of Sartre’s 
 
 29   
journal Les Temps Modernes. I remember that in 1945, when this journal was founded, at 
the same time that Sartre was defining what he called engaged literature, he was asking 
all of us—all who attended the founding of this publication—to not belong to any 
political party. That is to say, the idea of engagement was far from being confused for 
him with the compliance with a dominant or established opinion. 
 I believe there is a second misunderstanding about this notion of engagement that 
also needs to be removed. We often imagine that when we ask philosophy to be engaged, 
we at the same time recommend that it abandons its theoretical method in order to replace 
philosophy in the traditional sense with conceptual discussions, through a more literary 
mode of thought that is more immediately accessible. But, I think it is worth mentioning 
that Sartre, for example, who we are talking about, did not in any way renounce his 
technical system since, as you know, Being and Nothingness is a very abstract and 
difficult work. 
 So I believe that the only real sense in which those who first brought up the notion 
of engagement is the following: they understand engaged philosophy very simply as a 
philosophy that does not define or encourage a value10 without putting it to the test of 
concrete situations in which it is destined to be manifest. So, taking the word in this 
sense, I would be able to respond to your question. 
 I do not believe that engagement in this sense is a transient mode, and I also do 
not believe for that matter that it is a modern invention. In some sense, we could say that 
engagement has always been practiced in great philosophy. It has been practiced in the 
 
10 “Valeur” has a larger meaning than “value,” also encompassing “merit,” “authority,” “basis” and 
“worth.” 
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form of a philosophical action. The Presocratics, who were at least making the 
philosopher a priest and a head of state in some occasions; Socrates; the stoics; 
Montaigne, in some sense; Leibniz, even, since he was involved in negotiations for a 
terrestrial religious organization; Spinoza, since he did public acts, in any case, he created 
graffiti that was meant to stigmatize statesmen who displeased him; the philosophers of 
the eighteenth century; Marx, of course; Alain, more recently; all of these philosophers 
have always admitted that one could not be a philosopher without demonstrating certain 
actions. And when philosophers do not go that far, they are content to write books, which 
is already a lot, and these books are often dedicated to action. All of the great 
philosophies contain a politics. There is a politics of Plato, there is one, even several, of 
Hegel, and it’s not necessary to give other examples. 
 What’s characteristic of the philosopher is, therefore, not to be uninterested in 
action and politics, but, as Alain said, not to profit from them. The philosopher is 
someone who takes an interest in these things with a particular, more intense manner than 
others perhaps, but who does not profit from them. So, there has always been engagement 
in good philosophy. You might ask me why, in these conditions, was it possible and 
necessary to reintroduce this notion of engagement twenty years ago, or five years ago, as 
if it were a novelty. Well, because, in the meantime, between the great philosophy of 
which I was speaking and us, a tradition was established, that is not a philosophic 
tradition—that is more of an academic tradition of recent origin that wanted the 
philosopher to express himself in theses, a tradition that wanted the philosopher to 
express himself in uniquely abstract works: Plato wrote dialogues, and today we publish 
theses. And from this resulted in a particular conception of academic propriety that wants 
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certain questions to never be evoked in the form that they are posed to most people. So, 
here is a tradition, I would say, that is not really philosophical. In some sense, it is 
somewhat inhuman, because it signifies that philosophy tends to become a specialty, and 
I believe that the existence of this tradition justifies at the same time the use of a word 
like engagement in order to remind the philosopher of his duty, without which one could 
say that this notion of engagement is completely novel. 
P. - But what explanation can you offer for the attitude of many contemporary thinkers 
who make use of the disciplines of the novel, theater, and maybe cinema, in order to 
develop and make their philosophical concepts known? 
M.P. - You know, there is already much to say there. Firstly, there is, note this, that even 
the philosophers among our contemporaries who express themselves through literature 
never do so through literature alone. Gabriel Marcel writes plays, but he also writes 
philosophical works, and the same goes for Sartre. In addition, it has to be asked whether 
philosophy is really moving towards literature, or if there isn’t also a movement from 
literature towards philosophy. I am citing names in no particular order: since Mallarmé, 
since Proust, since Gide, since surrealism, literature has itself become philosophical, or 
philosophy. It is, therefore, more of a question of contact made between the two fields 
than one of the subordination of one to the other. 
 And when I say contact made, I could say again what I said earlier: contact 
resumed. The decorous separation between literature and philosophy did not exist at the 
time of German Romanticism as, once again, we introduce it today. Hegel, for example, 
read Rameau’s Nephew by Diderot, and even earlier Descartes did not think himself 
devalued in writing the script for a ballet. Whereas today, if one of us, professors of 
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philosophy, wrote the script for a ballet, well, we would say that he is waning. And, well, 
I wouldn’t recommend writing ballets to any philosopher, but I think there is something 
meaningful in this type of prudishness arising in our philosophy and our literature for so 
many years now. And if we understand it as such, the reminder of the union seems to me 
to be a happy one, even if it is accompanied by misunderstandings that I tried to clear up 
earlier. 
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MIND-BODY DUALISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MERLEAU-PONTY 
 
Absolutely central to much of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical work is the 
overturning of philosophical prejudices he deems to have obscured our ability to see and 
understand human experience and expression. The first interview I have translated opens 
with Merleau-Ponty explaining the origin of his philosophy is found in the pervasiveness 
of mind-body dualism:  
Essentially, you see, what always struck me throughout all of my studies was that 
our teachers were for the most part Cartesians… so [they] accepted a categorical 
distinction between mind and body, which was the distinction of what is 
consciousness and what is object, existence as object and existence as 
consciousness being in contradiction with each other (Entretiens avec Georges 
Charbonnier, 421).11  
 
Mind-body dualism is found throughout philosophy and the sciences alike, and its 
extensive grasp leads most people to accept its tenants uncritically. The first interview 
above starts with mind-body dualism as the first term and explains how perception, the 
phenomenal body and language can be seen as areas of experience in which the 
“junction” between mind and body is shown to be indivisible. He speaks to related 
aspects of overcoming the dualist prejudice in the other two interviews as well. Since the 
interview format demands that Merleau-Ponty sacrifice a more in-depth explanation of 
how each of the subjects he presents relates to the paradigm of mind-body dualism and 
how they can be interpreted by the phenomenological method, I will try to expand upon 
 
11 This citation is my translation from the interviews above. Any quote from Entretiens avec 
Georges Charbonnier that appears in this thesis will also be my translation, noting the page 
number in the corresponding French text. 
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what is said throughout these interviews on the subjects of perception, the body, language 
and praxis. 
Perception revealed itself to be an obvious starting place for Merleau-Ponty, since 
“in certain regards [it] is the least spiritual, the least pure thought,” and this places his 
analysis in opposition to Descartes (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 423). In 
perception, we immediately run into a “connection” between the mind and body: 
perception requires objects that are perceived as well as some kind of subjective 
experience in the person who perceives. Furthermore, perception seems rather simple and 
well understood by the sciences and philosophy alike. This allows Merleau-Ponty to 
point out and comprehend how, just as he found in his studies, most people simply take 
the paradigm of mind and body for granted without any questioning of this foundation. 
The traditional attitudes surrounding perception tend to come from the empiricist 
or rationalist traditions, or some mixture of these traditions that borrows convenient 
points from them. In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty focuses on 
explaining the problems found within these traditional approaches to perception. 
Merleau-Ponty gives brief indications of this work in the interviews, indicating that the 
mind-body dualist misses out on the complicated incorporation of our body in perception:  
It seemed to me that one could show that in large my body is not only, as 
everyone knows, the seat of a certain number of conditions that govern the 
appearance of my perception of red or green or blue, my body is not only cause in 
this sense, and even if I describe things as they happen inside of me, from my 
point of view, it is not at all necessary to say that my body is the cause of 
perceptions; but it is more so the intermediary between me and exterior objects 
and perception, it’s to be in relationship with objects and aspects of objects and of 
relations between objects by the intermediary of a body (Entretiens avec Georges 
Charbonnier, 426). 
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In some sense, the body is clearly the cause of perception, but there needs to be more 
nuance than the empiricist and rationalist allow. The body is not the cause in the sense 
that it blindly receives sense data that is translated to a physical brain and causes an 
image corresponding to this sense data as the empiricist claims. Nor is the body the cause 
of perception in the sense that it is guided by the thetic action of the mind as the 
rationalist claims. In both of these approaches, the body is stripped of any internal 
meaning, and the more immediate connection we have with the body is clouded and 
removed. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty approaches perception with the phenomenological 
method, which he addresses more fully in the second interview. 
 As Merleau-Ponty points out in the beginning of the second interview, there is a 
certain ambiguity in phenomenology itself that mimics the ambiguity of our experience 
of perception, the body, language and so forth. Phenomenology, as seen in the philosophy 
of Edmund Husserl, is attached to both lived experience and scientific rigor in a 
seemingly paradoxical way. Merleau-Ponty clarifies that he is discussing science in the 
more general sense that is found in the corresponding German word (Wissenschaft), 
allowing phenomenology to be a science without being restricted in the way of the 
empiricist and the rationalist. 
 Following this theme of lived experience, Merleau-Ponty also describes the 
importance of the body in perception:  
Husserl… attempts to show that when we are perceiving something exterior, this 
is a sort of activity of our body, our body viewed as a system of powers. He 
doesn’t analyze perception as we normally do, as an operation of the mind alone, 
as one does in the Cartesian tradition. He tries to show that there is an “I can,” a 
power, with which the body is equipped, a power of investigation, a power of 
exploration with regard to exterior objects, and that this motivating and carnal 
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relation of my body with the object is a completely essential dimension of the 
thing perceived (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 132-133). 
 
When examining perception on the basis of our lived experience, it is clear that 
perception is accomplished in the body. Our body exists for us as our power to 
investigate the world, and if the body was not an active participant in perception, we 
would never be compelled to explore the world surrounding us. This ultimately means 
that while perception does involve the subjective action of our particular consciousness, it 
can only occur through the medium of our body that is actively establishing our 
connection with the world. Furthermore, the phenomenological approach points out that 
perception is not unidirectional. Whereas for the empiricist the outside objects fully 
determine our perception and for the rationalist our consciousness governs perception, by 
contrast Merleau-Ponty shows how the relationship between object and subject is more 
like the give and take of a dance wherein these two terms can never truly be separated. 
When we hear a loud bang upstairs, this phenomenon solicits our consciousness, and our 
consciousness will then act upon the phenomenon accordingly. 
 The second interview also helps to clarify where the inconsistencies between 
phenomenology and science are found. Phenomenology seeks to describe our most 
immediate experience of the world as the foundation upon which all other reflective 
experience is found; phenomenology seeks to “investigate the significance of lived 
experience (vécu), at the level of lived experience (vécu) itself” (Entretiens avec Georges 
Charbonnier, 140). And as Merleau-Ponty explains in this interview, “between 
experience in the primary sense, from an original perspective, and experience in the 
radical sense of philosophical [and scientific] consciousness, there is almost an 
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incompatibility” (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 134). The mind-body dualist 
attempts to reconstitute experience from the perspective of a reflective consciousness, 
and for this reason they miss the phenomenon of perception. And since “[t]here are 
several degrees of lived experience,” as Merleau-Ponty claims in the second interview, 
this discussion naturally leads us further down the path towards reflective experience in 
the form of language (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 134). 
 Merleau-Ponty makes the connection between language in the body very clear in 
the second interview, describing language as “the body… of the mind” (Entretiens avec 
Georges Charbonnier, 136). And just as the empiricist and rationalist render the physical 
body passive in the act of perception, both fail to recognize the sense that is found within 
language itself. Both of these traditions describe words as if they were some empty 
envelope for thought. In contrast, just as with the junction between mind and body, 
Merleau-Ponty recognizes that the connection between thought and language is more 
complicated and ambiguous than the foundation of mind-body dualism can allow for. 
Moreover, language is so fundamental to our thought that “[i]t conveys the entire world 
of thought… [and] subsumes everyone” (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 136). 
Making another connection to the body, Merleau-Ponty describes speech as a kind of 
gesture, since it contains a sense within itself and aims at expression. 
 This last point brings us to the third interview as an application of Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy. The discipline of philosophy is often criticized for being unengaged 
in the world, as if it dealt with some kind of pure theory. But given Merleau-Ponty’s 
discussion of language this can easily be seen to be off base. In claiming that philosophy 
is found purely in the realm of theory, the critic is supposing that such a world exists in 
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the first place. This seems to arise naturally out of the mind-body dualist position, which 
assumes a distinction between thought and the “real” world. But since language, like any 
other gesture, always aims at expression in the world, and since this distinction between 
subjective thought and objective world is problematic, even philosophers who are 
concerned only with writing books are necessarily engaged with the world. In fact, any 
work that does not put its values “to the test of concrete situations in which it is destined 
to be manifest” cannot truly be considered philosophy (Entretiens avec Georges 
Charbonnier, 73). 
 The mind-body dualist looks for engagement only in the concrete actions of 
political institutions. But as the feminist mantra “the personal is political” suggests, 
politics is found in our personal lives as much as it is in our explicitly political lives. In a 
similar way, all philosophies contain a politics without needing to do so explicitly. For 
this reason Merleau-Ponty argues that the philosopher who does not endorse a political 
movement is still engaged in the world, as “[a]ll… philosophies contain a politics” 
(Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 74). It is also worth mentioning that many of the 
biggest figures in philosophies were explicitly political: Plato wrote Socrates’ criticisms 
of political leaders, Marx was deeply concerned with the economic system of capitalism 
and its ramifications, Jean-Paul Sartre was very active in the French communist party, 
and so forth. Merleau-Ponty explains the engagement of Husserl very well in the second 
interview, as well as the way in which the phenomenological approach is necessarily 
engaged in our lived experience.  
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Mind-Body Dualism and Perception 
Despite giving these interviews some sixty years ago, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
observation that most people accept the conceptual paradigm of mind-body dualism 
without question continues to seem true to me today. As a student in philosophy, I often 
encountered mind-body dualism in the classroom, from philosophers, professors and 
students alike. This is the result of a deep intellectual tradition within the history of 
philosophy. In the first interview, Merleau-Ponty illustrates this tendency by revisiting 
Descartes’s famous analysis of thought being essential to our ability to grasp a piece of 
wax (which we will consider further below). Descartes was part of a tradition of thought 
that argued the mind and its activity was the only solid epistemological foundation. This 
tradition is commonly referred to as rationalism. Merleau-Ponty also refers to some 
approaches to psychology as typifying the rationalist approach to mind-body dualism in 
the sciences of the time. However, largely as a result of developments in the natural 
sciences, we now mostly encounter mind-body dualism from the opposite tradition—
namely, empiricism, which broadly argues that sense perception of material (typically 
characterized as matter in motion governed by laws) is the foundation of epistemology 
rather than activity of the mind. Merleau-Ponty uses physiology as a representative of 
empiricism in the sciences of his time. One of Merleau-Ponty’s contributions to 
philosophy is the articulation of the commonality of mind-body dualism in both 
rationalism and empiricism, and the consequences of this assumption for our 
understanding of many phenomena, especially perception. 
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Following Merleau-Ponty, let us begin to see how mind-body dualism affects our 
understanding of perception.12 According to the physiologist (taken as a representative of 
the empiricist tradition), there is a clear dichotomy between the subject and the outside 
objective world. The physiologist assumes that the outside world consists of various 
definite properties, lengths, sizes, colors, and quantities. These are all best understood 
through measurement, because the process of translating them to the subject through 
sensory organs can alter them, whereas measurements do not change depending on the 
person. Perception is then thought of as exactly this process of translating stimuli from 
the outside world through pre-established pathways in the body that present the otherwise 
independent subject with an image, taste, or other form of perception.13 Theoretically, 
since perception is caused purely by outside stimuli, the images transmitted to our brains 
should correspond neatly to the objects that are being perceived. Physiology relies on a 
“constancy hypothesis” wherein “there is… a point by point correspondence and a 
constant connection between the stimulus and the elementary perception” 
(Phenomenology of Perception, 8). Yet this is often not the case: the various colored 
pixels of a television screen create the image of a uniform color that does not match that 
of the individual pixels; paintings portray three dimensional landscapes on two 
dimensional canvases; dark shapes in our closet at night take on the form of a person, etc. 
 
12 Both The Structure of Behavior and the Phenomenology of Perception respond to this paradigm of mind-
body dualism. Since the latter does not “submit to considering man from the outside, as one does in the 
psychological methodology of behavior,” and since Merleau-Ponty himself admits that it is more complete 
on this subject in the third interview, I will here focus on the Phenomenology of Perception as it connects 
to his interviews (Entretiens Avec Georges Charbonnier, 423). 
13 The empiricist position, as seen in behaviorism, only considers the subject from the outside, losing any 
internal motivations that might seem immediate to the act of perception. Instead, only the outside stimulus 
is given “the dignity of a cause” while “the organism is passive” (The Structure of Behavior, 9). As a result, 
any action on the part of the subject must be defined solely in terms of how the outside stimulus interacts 
with the pre-established pathways in the body, leaving physiology as the sole explanatory force. 
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Since empiricists favor the exterior world over what we actually perceive, they place the 
blame on our bodily sensations to explain discrepancies between perception and the 
objects perceived. A physiologist will likely say that the depth in a painting and the 
uniform color on the TV screen are “illusions” given to the subject because of the 
limitations and imperfections of the perceptive organs. Merleau-Ponty sums up the 
empiricist approach to perception while discussing the Müller-Lyer illusion (see Figure 
1). 
 
Figure 1, drawing of the Müller-Lyer Illusion. 
https://www.illusionsindex.org/ir/mueller-lyer 
 
To describe it in mathematical terms, the Müller-Lyer illusion consists of two parallel 
line segments of measurably equal length. The endpoints of the closed line segments 
coincide with the vertices of four closed acute angles of equal length. On one of the 
parallel line segments, the two acute angles face away from the center of the line 
segment, and on the other line segment, the two angles face toward the center of the 
segment. The line segment with the outward facing angles (the top form in Figure 1) can 
appear longer than the line segment with the inward facing angles (the bottom form in 
Figure 1) despite the segments being measurably of the same length. In the objective 
world of the empiricist, there is an error in our perception of the line segments when we 
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see them to be of unequal length. This “error” can somehow be corrected by paying 
closer attention. Yet both the perception of the different line segment lengths and the 
“corrected” perception where we see the line segments to be equal in length are both 
equally possible impressions that a viewer can take from the figure. Either impression can 
happen. In saying that the perception of equal length segments is a more accurate act of 
perception, the empiricist is begging the question. As Merleau-Ponty explains:  
The question is whether the attentive perception… rather than revealing ‘normal 
sensation,’ does not substitute an exceptional arrangement for the original 
phenomenon. The law of constancy cannot, against the evidence of 
consciousness, make use of a single critical experiment in which it itself is not 
already implied, and it is already presupposed wherever it is believed to be 
established” (Phenomenology of Perception, 8). 
 
When empiricists argue that attentively perceiving the Müller-Lyer Illusion leads to 
seeing the normal or correct sensation, they could rather be merely substituting one 
sensation for another. The reasoning for preferring the sensation of equal length is merely 
the belief that perception should have constancy with the objective qualities of the world. 
The empiricist cannot accept the ambiguous character of the Müller-Lyer illusion because 
it does not correspond to the object that is being perceived, therefore failing to match up 
with the constancy hypothesis. But our perception must be consistent with the constancy 
hypothesis only because of the way the empiricist frames perception in the first place, as 
resulting purely from the outside stimuli of the objective world. We are still left without 
an explanation as to why perception is based on the object in itself, as something distinct 
from our consciousness. Furthermore, it seems strange that we should deny our lived 
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experience of the inherent ambiguity of perception and find some ulterior apparatus to 
explain away this ambiguity in the form of inattention.14 
The physiological approach may be grasping a partial truth in its description of 
perception. Perception does depend on having the sensory systems which take in 
information from a person’s surroundings. But as Merleau-Ponty says in the interviews, 
the physiological description of perception can only be partial, because it comes out of 
“the maimed experience of the sciences”—i.e., the physiologist’s methods 
mischaracterize experience by only examining it in the terms of natural science (as the 
interplay of objective facts, pathways and forces), therefore failing to give place to how 
experience happens as it presents itself in its own terms or from the “interior” (Entretiens 
avec Georges Charbonnier, 142). Even the examples that seem to most readily support 
the physiological analysis, such as physical damage that leads to the loss of perception, 
can be seen to be incomplete. Irreparable damage to sense organs will necessarily result 
in the diminishing and ultimate loss of sensation: cataracts if left untreated may lead to 
total blindness. But it is mistaken to describe this transition purely as the diminishing of 
perception. Instead, the cataract patient’s perception is reduced to a more simplistic or 
primitive structure in several observable phases.15  Merleau-Ponty concludes: 
“[c]onversely, normal functioning must be understood as a process of integration in 
which the text of the external world is not copied, but constituted” (Phenomenology of 
Perception, 9). In perception, it is not the case that the objective world is merely 
 
14 The empiricist’s account of perception skips over the first order description and finds itself dealing only 
with the second order description of a reflective consciousness in an object world. As Merleau-Ponty 
writes, “classical analyses have missed the phenomenon of perception” (Phenomenology of Perception, 3). 
15 Merleau-Ponty quotes Viktor Freiherr von Weizsäcker, a German physician who made significant 
contributions to Gestalt Theory to help make his point (Phenomenology of Perception, 9). 
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imperfectly copied; there is something more that is occurring. Given the inadequacy of 
the physiological explanation of perception, it might seem that an investigation on the 
basis of the action of consciousness is warranted, so let us follow Merleau-Ponty and 
examine the opposite tradition—the rationalist tradition. 
The rationalist approach argues that focusing the activity of the mind is the best 
model for discussing perception and reality more broadly. A paradigmatic example can 
be seen in Descartes’s description of a piece of wax, as Merleau-Ponty mentions in his 
interview with Georges Charbonnier (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 424-425). 
What most interests Merleau-Ponty about Descartes’s thought experiment is its 
description of perception and how the subject is related to exterior objects. The 
paradigmatic wax example is found in Mediations on First Philosophy. In the 
Meditations, Descartes is working on many goals, but the first philosophical project is to 
discover what is indubitable in his own understanding so that he secures a bedrock of 
solid knowledge from which to work in order to accurately understand reality. To 
expedite this goal Descartes treats as false anything dubious—i.e., anything of which he 
is uncertain of the truth or has even a single reason to doubt. Given his experience with 
misperceptions and dreams and given the possibility that an all-powerful and deceptive 
demon is the origin of the sensations he experiences, Descartes begins by distrusting all 
evidence from the senses and denies the certain reality of all physical bodies including his 
own. Through this process, the only thing Descartes arrives at that is impossible to doubt 
is that he is doubting, thinking, wondering—i.e., that these activities are occurring and 
that they are occurring to someone. Even if an evil demon were deceiving him, he would 
be that which is so deceived. It is indubitably true that he thinks, that he is (Descartes, 
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24). Building on this foundation, he wonders what else he is. He realizes that he has 
thoughts of bodies, sensations, and it is here in the Meditations that the example of a 
piece of wax is used in the argument. I will present a brief view of Descartes’s discussion 
as it figures prominently in the third interview I translated. 
In the course of the Second Meditation, Descartes interrogates a piece of wax as a 
piece of extended reality that can be sensed. Descartes thinks that the piece of wax shares 
the general qualities of all bodies, but to avoid being overly general, he asks the reader to 
consider the particular and specific example of a piece of wax recently taken from a 
beehive. 
Take this wax. It has just been extracted from the honeycomb. It has not yet 
completely lost the taste of honey and it still retains some of the scent of the 
flowers from which it was collected. Its colour, shape and size are obvious. It is 
hard, cold, easy to touch and, if tapped with a finger, it emits a sound. Thus it has 
everything that is required for a body to be known as distinctly as possible. But 
notice that, as I speak, it is moved close to the fire. It loses what remains of its 
taste, its smell is lost, the colour changes, it loses its shape, increases in size, 
becomes liquid, becomes hot and can barely be touched. Nor does it emit a sound 
if tapped. But does the wax not remain? It must be agreed that it does; no one 
denies that, no one thinks otherwise (Descartes, 27). 
 
Descartes observes (or imagines) that the wax taken from the beehive has a particular 
smell, feel, sound, appearance and taste when it is first observed, and then all of these 
particular sensorial qualities change when the wax is placed close to the fire. Yet, in 
either form we understand that the wax is still wax. From these observations, Descartes 
argues that none of the sensorial qualities are essential to the piece of wax, so there must 
be some other constant to which we have access in order to understand that it is the same 
piece of wax. 
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Descartes is working towards two goals in this description of perception: 
discovering what is essential to the wax as an object separate from our consciousness and 
discovering our role in perception. Since the physical properties of the wax are 
subjective, i.e., they appeal to our sensations and not our intelligence, they are considered 
a second-order experience and ultimately unessential to the wax.16 In fact, all of the 
physical properties of wax can change without creating a new object that is distinct from 
the original piece of wax. This means that the wax’s essence as something totally distinct 
from ourselves is unattainable by sensory perception. For Descartes, given the 
inadequacy of sensory investigation, our role in true perception must be as a thinking 
subject: “Something that I thought I saw with my eyes, therefore, was really grasped 
solely by my mind’s faculty of judgment” (Descartes, 28). Furthermore, even though 
perception seems to form a link between the subject and object, because perception is 
always perception of some object, to a rationalist it is still the mind which establishes the 
link. Merleau-Ponty describes in the interview:  
As soon as the mind reflects on its real nature, it sees itself only as pure 
conscience, thought in the cartesian sense, and it is the mind itself that is again the 
spectator of the relationship between mind and body. It sees the relationship, 
thinks it, establishes it, this is a part of the universe of thought, but it isn’t a link 
between thought and anything else besides itself (Entretiens avec Georges 
Charbonnier, 422). 
 
To rationalists, like Descartes, thought is the spectator of the relationship with the mind 
and physical objects and this is merely another specialized activity of the mind, and 
 
16 As Merleau-Ponty explains in the interview: “There is a link between my mind and my body since, for 
example, I perceive according to what happens in the outside world, according to the action that external 
objects exert on my senses, and, in consequence, this demonstrates an effect of the body on the mind, and 
inversely, there is an effect of the mind on my body when I move, when I displace my body, but these 
issues, for thinkers formed by the school of Descartes and Kant, these phenomena are phenomena of a 
second order” (Entretiens avec George Charbonnier, 421). 
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therefore does not require anything besides itself. Even further than describing perception 
as the action of the mind on outside objects, the rationalist believes that perception only 
takes place in the mind: any investigation of the world is on the basis of conscious action, 
leaving perception only on the level of the reflective mind, independent of its objects of 
investigation. Descartes concludes that the essence of a piece of wax is fundamentally 
distinct from ourselves, accessed only through rational reflection, and that perception is 
ultimately a species of thought. This dichotomy between subject and object is passed 
down through many of the important figures in the history of modern philosophy, and it 
is this paradigm of which Merleau-Ponty is highly critical throughout his career.  
Merleau-Ponty identifies a problem at the very foundation of Descartes’s thought 
experiment: the wax and the observer are considered separate discrete units in advance 
and perception is thus believed to be a kind of rational reflection. These premises direct 
the investigation toward a pursuit of the object-in-itself and toward a description of the 
action done by the mind. In contrast, according to Merleau-Ponty, we need to begin again 
with the description of perception as the first term and let the wax and the observer 
emerge from this more immediate ground if we want to come to a more accurate 
understanding of perception. This rethinking also allows perception to not necessarily be 
a faculty of the reflective (i.e., self-understanding, deliberate) consciousness, but it is 
allowed to exist in a more ambiguous, pre-reflective consciousness. In fact, when we 
conceive of perception from the point of view of our immediate, lived experience, there is 
no reason to give thought the role of arbiter between the observer and the object as 
Descartes argued.  
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 From the rationalist position, as seen in Descartes, it is our minds that establish 
our connection with the world. Rational thought is the only force which can constitute 
objects, and it is solely on this basis that we can come to knowledge of the outside world. 
Yet if this were true, if thought were this fundamental to perception, then it would seem 
impossible to have the ambiguous perception of the Müller-Lyer illusion. Furthermore, 
the rationalist position would not allow for the outside world to attract our attention. In 
fact, Merleau-Ponty argues that “we need to be ignorant of what we are looking for, or… 
we would not go looking for it” (Phenomenology of Perception, 30). If pure thought was 
truly our mode of insertion in the world as well as what constitutes the objects therein, we 
would already know of everything that we might perceive. We would not be drawn to a 
bright light in a dark room or a loud noise upstairs if our minds were the force rationalism 
takes them to be. 
Though rationalism and empiricism seemingly come from opposite sides of the of 
intellectual spectrum, Merleau-Ponty concludes that they ultimately make the same 
mistake by analyzing perception from the point of view of a scientific, reflective 
consciousness rather than from that of our immediate experience of perception. In both 
cases “[w]e build perception out of the perceived. And since the perceived is obviously 
only accessible through perception, in the end we understand neither” (Phenomenology of 
Perception, 5). The rationalist is just as guilty of begging the question as the empiricist, 
both privileging the object in itself over the lived experience of perception. It is made 
clear by this common foundational fault that it is not enough to develop new ways of 
explaining away inconsistencies within each of these approaches, nor is it enough to form 
some hybrid approach that combines aspects of the physiologist and the psychologist. 
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Instead, we must find a new approach that gets beyond the foundation of mind-body 
dualism that clouds our experience and that “seeks to reconstruct actual perception” on 
the basis of an objective world in which we do not dwell (Phenomenology of Perception, 
11). Indeed, when Merleau-Ponty contends in the first interview above that “to perceive, 
this is not to think... it’s something else,” he means that perception is on an order of 
experience that is more foundational than reasoning (Entretiens avec Georges 
Charbonnier, 427). Giving an account of perception that assumes it operates on the same 
basis as our reflective, scientific consciousness will therefore be incomplete, only 
grasping part of the whole and perhaps worse this approach to perception may 
misunderstand perception entirely. 
An important consequence of the abstract (and thus problematic) accounts of 
perception is that our understanding of how perception works is intimately bound up with 
our understanding of who we as perceivers are. By attempting to enframe perception as 
merely an objective process, the empiricist renders the observer an entirely passive being 
who is confronted by a series of discrete objects, interacting with our world without 
intention and without a goal in mind. By attempting to enframe perception as merely a 
subjective process, the rationalist renders the observer an entirely active being that 
constitutes the objects and the world and cannot therefore meaningfully interact with the 
world. Merleau-Ponty summarizes the problem with both of the classical approaches to 
perception: “[w]hat was lacking for empiricism was an internal connection between the 
object and the act it triggers. What intellectualism [rationalism] lacks is the contingency 
of the opportunities for thought. Consciousness is too poor in the first case and too rich in 
the second for any phenomenon to be able to solicit it” (Phenomenology of Perception, 
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30). When we turn our heads towards a loud crash outside of the house, it is not done 
blindly and without some sense as the empiricist argues. For their part, the rationalist 
would have trouble explaining away the obvious way this phenomenon acts on our 
consciousness. Just as Gestalt Theory is concerned with ensembles—i.e., with the form of 
phenomena as wholes whose parts are inseparably linked to each other, we must look at 
our interaction with the world as inseparably linked with ourselves: perception is not 
unidirectional. The objects we perceive draw our attention and act on us just as we act on 
them by looking at and interacting with them. The relation between ourselves and the 
exterior world as seen in perception is more like a dance with a give and take between 
partners as opposed to the lifeless, unidirectional interaction presented by empiricism and 
rationalism. We, as perceivers, are then in the complicated place of being always both 
active and passive rather than merely one or the other. We might then ask how this 
active/passive relationship unfolds, and where the pre-reflective process of perception is 
discovered. Merleau-Ponty clearly links his work on perception to the concept of the 
phenomenal body in the interview above as a logical next step in his philosophy, so let us 
turn there to make address this next question. 
 
The Phenomenal Body 
 In giving a more thorough description of perception from the point of view of our 
immediate experience, Merleau-Ponty runs into the role of our body in this process. Once 
again to mark his contrast with Descartes, Merleau-Ponty gives a broad characterization 
of Descartes’s attitude to the body. For Descartes, the body is simply “one of the mind’s 
objects, one of the objects it takes an interest in and that it considers from afar” 
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(Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 426-427). This quote would suggest that the body 
is only tangentially related to the mind, just as with any other object in the world. In the 
opposite tradition (empiricism), as seen in physiology, our body is what makes up the 
entirety of experience, and consciousness is nothing more than neurons firing in the 
physical brain. Yet again in contrast, Merleau-Ponty continues in the phenomenological 
tradition, arguing that “when we are perceiving something exterior, this is a sort of 
activity of our body, our body viewed as a system of powers” (Entretiens avec Georges 
Charbonnier, 132). Perception is not “an operation of the mind alone,” but rather requires 
the investigative power of the body, which itself is a motivating factor behind our 
interaction with the objects that surround us (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 132). 
The body is exactly what allows phenomena to solicit our attention as well as what 
allows for our interaction with the world. We see again that the mind and body are both 
inextricably linked in our insertion into the world. 
 However, the paradigm of mind-body dualism is again pervasive when giving 
accounts of the body, and the empiricist’s and rationalist’s accounts are well known in 
science and philosophy alike. Just as with perception, these traditions are only able to 
partially grasp our embodied experience. Both extend the dichotomy between 
consciousness and the object to the body, treating the two as distinct and discrete units. In 
opposition to the empiricist and rationalist traditions, Merleau-Ponty persists in 
describing an existence that is “between” the psychical and the physiological.17 
 
17 “Between the psychical and physiological” is a section header in the chapter “The Body as an Object and 
Mechanistic Physiology” (Phenomenology of Perception, 75-91). Just as is made clear in Merleau-Ponty’s 
analysis of perception, he is not searching for some hybrid approach, as this would not go beyond the 
foundation of mind-body dualism which prevents the psychical and physiological approaches from 
grasping our true relationship with our body. 
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Borrowing from the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty gives an account of 
“being in the world” as the term for embodied experience that avoids mind-body dualism. 
Investigating an example of how our relationship with the body is not well-
described by the empiricist and the rationalist will help to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s 
contrasting approach. He argues that our way of existing in the world cannot be reduced 
to acts of consciousness (as in rationalism) or to objective forces interacting (as in 
empiricism). Consider, for example, how particular situations can bring about immediate 
reactions from us and how these reactions often are not experienced as deliberate acts of 
our own choosing or as fully automatic processes set in play by the mere interplay of 
external forces. For instance, recently a butter knife dropped from my hand. To cushion 
its fall, I reached my foot out in an attempt to intercept it before it could hit the ground. If 
this reaction were processed fully by my consciousness, the danger and triviality of 
intercepting the dull knife with my bare foot would be apparent, and I would never risk 
injuring my foot for this purpose. Yet, when it happened, I experienced the situation as 
enacting a way of using my foot to catch objects that I developed through a lifetime of 
playing soccer and I did move to intercept it. Since this was not a deliberate or considered 
decision, one might think that it was an automatic reflex wherein my body was merely 
carrying out a predetermined interplay of forces. But the experience of cushioning the 
knife with my foot was not experienced as a moment of having my body taken over by 
external forces. Instead of experiencing it as being purely determined by forces beyond 
me or as purely decided by me in that moment, a better description of the reaction is that 
it was the result of a certain developed habit of using my body to catch falling objects by 
extending and subtly lowering my foot. I can even recollect stages in developing the 
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habit, often with deliberate exercises practiced over years as a soccer player. This last 
account of the experience allows for the situation to have much more ambiguity than the 
accounts of the empiricist and the rationalist. 
When we attend closely to what our pre-reflective experiences are like (as 
exemplified in habitual reactions), ambiguity is uncovered in many ways. Merleau-Ponty 
argues that a given situation is lived as an open call for our reaction, “without… being 
known for itself” (Phenomenology of Perception, 81). Merleau-Ponty compares this open 
situation to the first notes of a melody that sketch out the resolution in general terms. I 
might add to my account of cushioning the knife that I did not perceive discrete stimuli, 
in the way that the empiricist accounts for perception. Instead the situation was lived as 
an ambiguous whole and the knife fell more as a “thing-I-let-fall,” we might say. 
Furthermore, my reaction did not involve thetic action, as the rationalist argues. I did not 
think, “Where is my foot. OK, now where do I need it to be?”. Rather, the experience is 
better captured by the implicit sense “must-cushion-the-thing-falling.” In the lived 
experience of this situation, I felt like I was making use of a general power of my body. 
The falling butter knife clearly implies a reaction in general terms, but this stimulus is not 
the fully articulated cause of reflex as the physiologist would have us believe. We do not 
blindly respond to the stimuli of some objective world. The physiologist is right in 
characterizing such reactions as prereflective, but this is only a partial description that 
ignores the internal sense of the reflex. Moreover, the individual stimuli of the 
physiologist can only have meaning to us if they are taken as a whole. Merleau-Ponty 
explains further: “[t]he reflex does not result from objective stimuli, it turns towards 
them, it invests them with a sense that they did not have when taken one by one or as 
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physical agents, a sense that they only have when taken as a situation” (Phenomenology 
of Perception, 81). Given the physiologist’s inability to fully account for this 
phenomenon, we might mistakenly get the impression that I sent my foot out as some 
thetic action, as the rationalist claims. But this should be quickly dismissed, given the 
irrationality of putting my foot in danger from the perspective of reflective 
consciousness. Chances are that I will cut my foot and the knife will not be damaged in 
the fall. Furthermore, the falling knife did solicit my reaction and attention, which would 
be impossible in the rationalist framework.  
In phenomenology, we begin by dealing with a pre-reflective world that sketches 
out our possible actions without fully determining what we will do. It is precisely this 
pre-reflective perspective that distinguishes being in the world from physiological and 
psychological traditions and allows it to bridge the gap between the two. As Merleau-
Ponty summarizes:  
our ‘world’ has a particular consistency, relatively independent of stimuli, that 
forbids treating ‘being in the world’ as a sum of reflexes, and the pulsation of 
existence has a particular energy, relatively independent of our spontaneous 
thoughts, that precludes treating it as an act of consciousness (Phenomenology of 
Perception, 82).  
 
Just as with perception, our relationship to our body and the objects with which we 
interact is found most immediately in our pre-thetic experience. On this basis of “being in 
the world,” Merleau-Ponty seeks to characterize the interdependent relationship between 
our mind and body. To do so, he begins with an examination of the peculiar and 
ambiguous phenomenon of the phantom limb. 
 Merleau-Ponty uses this phenomenon of experiencing sensation from an 
amputated limb as an extreme that can help illustrate the way all of us relate to our own 
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bodies. The example of the phantom limb is quite complicated and the ambiguity there 
within can easily be seen. On the one hand, the patient often seems quite unaware of their 
amputation, to the point where they will step out onto a stump, and sometimes not even 
be discouraged by the fall, repeating this “mistake” over and over again. On the other 
hand, the patient often can vividly explain the sensations from the amputated limb all the 
while recognizing the sensation is emanating from a limb that no longer exists. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that this phenomenon cannot be adequately explained by 
the accounts of the physiologist or the psychologist. For the physiologist, “the phantom 
limb is the presence of a part of the body’s representation that should not be given” 
(Phenomenology of Perception, 82). However, the presence of the phantom limb can be 
explained away as an overactive nerve that used to be connected to the missing limb. Yet 
this limited account cannot explain the patient’s experience of the phantom limb as 
present. Moreover, there are undeniable psychological elements at play in the case of the 
phantom limb. For example, a patient who has never previously experienced a phantom 
may develop this sensation “when an emotion or a situation evokes those of the injury” 
(Phenomenology of Perception, 79). It is quite possible for an engineer who lost their arm 
years ago in an explosion to begin feeling sensation from the missing limb in the wake of 
a loud bang that imitates that of the explosion. Furthermore, the sensation from a 
phantom limb can sometimes be made to shrink and ultimately disappear entirely through 
psychological therapy. None of this can be explained by the purely material basis of the 
physiologist, and it would seem that we are dealing with the action of the mind in this 
case. We might then be persuaded to look into the rationalist’s account of the phantom 
limb as a more complete explanation, but this would also be in vain. 
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The rationalist ultimately believes that “the phantom limb becomes a memory”; in 
other words, this phenomenon is considered to be triggered simply by the memory of 
once having an actual limb in its place (Phenomenology of Perception, 82). Yet, as noted 
above, a patient with sensation from a phantom limb often seems quite unaware of their 
dismemberment, as they will continually attempt to walk on a missing leg and will not 
even be discouraged by the fall (Phenomenology of Perception, 83). Describing the 
phantom limb as a memory in the purely rational sense would place it in the realm of 
reflection, but there must be some emotional component as well. As Merleau-Ponty 
explains, the phantom limb “could not be memory if the object that it constructs was not 
still held by some intentional threads to the horizon of the lived past,” and this 
intentionality cannot be found in “one cogitatio [that] necessitates another cogitatio” 
(Phenomenology of Perception, 88). Descartes’s thinking subject, as detached from its 
emotions, would not be motivated to turn towards a past in which the body was whole. 
Being in the world, on the other hand, does not limit itself to the restrictions of the 
cogitatio, and is therefore able to grasp how “emotion can be at the origin of the 
situation” (Phenomenology of Perception, 88). Indeed, Merleau-Ponty argues that 
“memory, emotion, and the phantom limb are equivalent with regard to being in the 
world” (Phenomenology of Perception, 88). Each of these can only be properly 
understood by recognizing the intertwinement or co-relation of body and world. 
Furthermore, there is some physical dimension at play in the phenomenon of the phantom 
limb that cannot be denied. If a surgery is performed that severs the relevant nerves that 
run from what is left of the phantom limb to the brain, all sensation from the missing limb 
will cease (Phenomenology of Perception, 79). Clearly the rationalist cannot account for 
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this physical factor and cannot give a sufficient explanation of the phantom limb as a 
memory in the sense of the purely rational subject. So, would the solution be found from 
simply taking explanations from both sides? 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty is quite clear that this would be ultimately fruitless. For 
these two approaches to co-determine this phenomenon, there would need to be “a single 
point of application or a common ground” between them (Phenomenology of Perception, 
79). It would be impossible to find the commonality between an approach that considers 
everything to be reduced to physical factors and one that believes solely in the action of 
the mind. The fundamental mistake committed by those who support the paradigm of 
mind-body dualism is to analyze phenomena from the perspective of reflective 
consciousness. Upon reflection, the patient is obviously aware that a limb has been 
amputated, yet amputees will step onto a missing leg with confidence. When describing 
phenomenology in the interview above, Merleau-Ponty explains that “[t]here are several 
degrees of lived experience,” and “between the two meanings of the word ‘experience’… 
between experience in the primary sense, from an original perspective, and experience in 
the radical sense of philosophical consciousness, there is almost an incompatibility” 
(Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 134). The empiricist and rationalist both examine 
phenomena from the secondary experience of rational reflection.18 But when someone 
steps onto a missing leg, they are not operating on this level, as they would certainly be 
aware of the missing limb upon reflection. Instead, they are acting on the basis of a more 
 
18 Merleau-Ponty is reversing Descartes’s claim that our immediate experience of phenomena are of a 
secondary order. For Descartes, rational reflection is the sole guide for experience, and our embodied life is 
secondary. For Merleau-Ponty, following others in the tradition of phenomenology, reflection is of a 
second order while our non-thetic life is our original mode of consciousness. 
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immediate relationship with their body and with the world around them. Just as 
perception is a mode of pre-reflective action, our relation to our body is prior to thought, 
i.e., more immediately accessible than reflective consciousness. And yet the different 
levels of lived experience are not clearly delineated from each other. To someone who is 
sensing a phantom limb, this limb is real, and at the same time, they are reflectively 
conscious that it does not tangibly exist. Their lived world, however, continues to hold 
open a place for its existence and its presence. 
This phenomenon perfectly demonstrates the seeming incompatibility between the 
more immediate lived experience of being in the world and the experience of reflective 
consciousness. As Merleau-Ponty explains: “if [the patient] treats [the phantom leg] in 
practice as a real limb, this is because, like the normal subject, he has no need of a clear 
and articulated perception of his body in order to begin moving it. It is enough that his 
body is ‘available’ as an indivisible power and that the phantom leg is sensed as vaguely 
implicated in it” (Phenomenology of Perception, 83). Our body is not some object that 
the mind orders to move, one foot after the other. We are able to perform many 
complicated tasks, such as typing, without first needing to contemplate where our hands 
are. In fact, when we are performing a habituated act like typing, trying to thetically think 
through the process is difficult to do in the first place, and will often get in the way of the 
task. To bring back the example of a falling butter knife, I reach out my foot because of 
my habituation of catching objects I have dropped with my foot, which itself comes out 
of a larger context of playing soccer since I was a child. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that we must distinguish two ways in which we experience 
and live our bodies.  
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It is as though our body comprises two distinct layers, that of the habitual body 
and that of the actual body. Gestures of manipulation that appear in the first have 
disappeared in the second, and the problem of how I can feel endowed with a limb 
that I no longer have in fact comes down to knowing how the habitual body can 
act as a guarantee for the actual body (Phenomenology of Perception, 84).  
 
The patient of amputation steps out onto a stump because they have a habitual sense of 
the body that is engaged in its tasks on a level more fundamental than thetic action. I kick 
my foot out to cushion a falling knife not for the sake of the knife, but because I have 
grown accustomed to doing so in order to protect my falling phone. And the patient who 
has lost this foot will still reach a phantom foot out because the falling object does not 
show up to them as some detached item in the objective world. Instead, on top of the 
notion of a habit body, the falling object appeals to the body in the particular manner of a 
thing to be manipulated. As Merleau-Ponty concludes: “I am conscious of my body 
through the world and if my body is the unperceived term at the center of the world 
toward which every object turns its face, then it is for the same reason that my body is the 
pivot of the world” (Phenomenology of Perception, 84). By describing the phenomenon 
of the phantom limb without the bias of an “objective” world that stands apart and 
separate from us, being in the world is able to provide a more complete analysis of the 
phenomenon than either the rationalist or the empiricist could. 
The body is not some object that can be fully distinguished from the surrounding 
world. Instead, our body is our mode of insertion in the world and the medium through 
which the subjective and objective, which themselves can never truly be distinct terms, 
are connected. We relate to our body more immediately than the rationalist can conceive 
of and more ambiguously than the empiricist claims. Furthermore, objects in the world 
relate to our body insofar as they are manipulable by it, implying the body and its objects 
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are inextricably linked. And as Merleau-Ponty makes clear in the first interview, this 
discussion of the body as the pivot of the world naturally guides us to language as a kind 
of body of thought. 
 
Language: First and Second-order19 
For Maurice Merleau-Ponty, this criticism of mind-body dualism naturally leads 
to a discussion of language. Just as an investigation of perception led to a discussion of 
language, the phenomenal body brings us to the topic of language and speech. As he 
explains in the first interview above,  
[o]nce we show, as I have tried to do, that to perceive, this is not to think, that it’s 
something else; once we have shown that the thinking subject of Descartes is 
linked to a body… it then remains to understand how it can be that such an 
embodied subject… is at the same time capable of operations that are beyond the 
means of the body… this led me to the close study of language (Entretiens avec 
Georges Charbonnier, 427). 
 
So far, we have been discussing aspects of our experience that are fundamentally pre-
reflective. An investigation of our use of language would seem to move us further 
towards the world of thought and reflective consciousness insofar as language is 
obviously deeply connected with our thought. In fact, the use of language is so 
fundamental to thought that “there are no thoughts that come to be actual, effective, to 
really capture something, without the help of speech, whether it is a matter of audible 
speech or one of interior speech” (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 427-428). And 
yet traditional approaches to language make the distinction between sign (word) and 
signification (thought) as if the two could be distinct terms. This distinction mimics the 
 
19 Sections of this essay were originally written for Introduction to the Study of Linguistics (INT 410) at 
the University of Maine, and reworked to fit into this part of the thesis. 
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dichotomy between mind and body, and traditional descriptions of the phenomenon of 
speech once again tend to be of either an empiricist or rationalist character; the empiricist 
explains the process through the mechanical response in the body when given the 
stimulus of a combination of words, and the rationalist believes that only the thoughts 
which are behind words give meaning to a sentence. These two argument forms may be 
extremes, but there is a common fault to be found in mind-body dualism as we have seen 
above with perception and the body. The empiricist and rationalist take opposite positions 
from the same basic framework, and it is this framework that is fundamentally 
problematic. It is worth exploring how these two perspectives on language examine the 
act of communication in order to point out where they fall short. 
 Merleau-Ponty opens the chapter in The Phenomenology of Perception on speech 
with a description of patients who struggle with aphasia of colors. When asked to group 
color samples together on the basis of their tint, these patients are notably slower and 
more meticulous in their process than the average person. The patient will need to pick up 
samples and compare two side by side in order to then classify them. They are largely 
successful with this tactic, but there are often substantial mistakes made. For example, 
after placing a pale red with a larger group of reds, a patient might then place a pale green 
sample in the same group. This perhaps indicates that they are not sustaining a consistent 
concept of color throughout the entire process. Merleau-Ponty explains further: “it is not 
the participation of the samples in a single idea that guides them, but rather the 
experience of an immediate resemblance, and this is why they can only classify the 
samples after having brought them together” (Phenomenology of Perception, 181). 
Patients retain a sense of immediate resemblance and this guides them as they group the 
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color samples. That these patients can be successful in grouping colors when comparing 
two samples in front of them shows that they can still make use of the instant, concrete 
aspect of language—namely, they are still able to employ language within the context of 
a simple task that does not require abstraction from the matter at hand.  
The problem for patients of aphasia lies in the move from particular samples of 
reds to the larger and more abstract category of “red.” This study of aphasia of colors is 
being used as a negative example by Merleau-Ponty, explaining how people who struggle 
with seemingly mundane tasks can help reveal the true way in which we experience a 
similar experience. Patients of aphasia are successful when dealing with terms on the 
level of automatic language but are incapable of moving to the more abstract nature of 
language. And if the problem with these patients lies in the abstract realm that more 
closely involves thetic action, it would appear that language is conditioned by thought for 
the average person, as the rationalist posits. 
 The rationalist also holds that the word does not have a sense on its own, 
essentially describing language as the empty envelope for thought. On this account, 
words are only used in order to communicate the idea to one another and they have no 
importance on their own. To some degree this is true: a chair could have been called 
anything; this particular word taken by itself may be arbitrary. But once this word has an 
accepted meaning according to a language community, it starts to take up meaning in 
relation to other words. And since none of us engages with this primary designation of 
objects but instead grows up with words whose relations have been sedimented long 
before us, the language we use is far from arbitrary. When thinking in terms of our 
immediate experience of language, this complicated distancing of language from thought 
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is dispelled. While engaged in a discussion, for example, there is no need to think 
everything out before speaking. Instead, thought is often accomplished within the act of 
speaking, as though the word were accomplishing the thinking. The experience is similar 
for the listener, insofar as there is no disconnect between the words heard and the 
thoughts embedded therein. Merleau-Ponty writes: “[t]he words occupy our entire mind, 
they come to fulfill our expectations… but we are not capable of predicting it” 
(Phenomenology of Perception, 185). If language was truly as the rationalist describes it, 
there would need to be some internal process that translates the arbitrary sounds of words 
into the thoughts behind them. And if this were the case, if each word had to be translated 
into its corresponding thought, it would be very difficult to keep up with a conversation; 
our use of language would be completely inefficient. More importantly, such an account 
simply does not line up with our experience of speech.  
The rationalist account of language also fails to explain how we come to an 
understanding of a difficult text. I have often had the experience of struggling to 
comprehend a philosophical text, especially when it contains significant technical 
descriptions that employ words in particular, nuanced ways. On the first reading, it may 
be the case that I have understood little of the philosophical significance of the text. That 
said, simply learning how the author writes can be a key first step to gaining further 
understanding. For example, I often struggled to understand the Phenomenology of 
Perception when first reading it. Merleau-Ponty has a particular rhetorical style in which 
he examines how the empiricist and the rationalist analyze phenomena, but he often does 
so without clear indications that he is critical of these perspectives. It is only when he 
begins to point out how the perspectives are inadequate that his argument becomes clear, 
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making those first sections retroactively meaningful. He explains this phenomenon of 
coming to understand a philosophically rigorous text in the following short passage: 
And just as, when in a foreign country, I begin to understand the sense of words 
by their place in a context of action and by participating in everyday life, so too a 
philosophical text that remains poorly understood nevertheless reveals to me at 
least a certain ‘style’... which is the first sketch of its sense. I begin to understand 
philosophy by slipping into this thought’s particular manner of existing 
(Phenomenology of Perception, 184-185). 
 
In this situation, it is the manner of the words themselves that reveals some meaning to 
their readers when they first try to comprehend the text, as the thoughts behind them 
remain unclear. The writing style and word choice in particular are not external to the 
argument; they actively portray and contain meaning. Merleau-Ponty compares the 
process of understanding a complicated text to an immersion experience, as in both cases 
we have to creatively engage with the language that is presented to us. Understanding 
another person is not a matter of getting beyond their language and grasping their 
thought, as the rationalist argues, but one of reading towards the sense contained within 
the words themselves. This again supports the idea that words have a sense on their own 
and it once again seems that the empiricist and rationalist are providing an overly 
simplistic model which can only partially grasp the phenomenon of language. In fact, 
language may be the most obviously ambiguous of the phenomena discussed up to this 
point. 
 To give a more concrete example, the difficulty of translation is well known. 
There are always shortcomings when comparing one language with another and while 
attempting a translation. Certain words cannot find a corresponding term in another 
language, and even those that do often cannot account for the nuanced uses of the original 
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word. The well-known Italian saying “Traduttore, traditore” (to translate is to betray) 
shows this point well. The original Italian is a pun on the similar sound of both words, 
who furthermore share the etymological root of “trans” (across, over). The corresponding 
English translation more or less captures the meaning, but necessarily loses some of the 
sense that comes from the words themselves.  
When it comes to more complicated translations, the inherent ambiguity of 
language can easily be seen. I ran into this problem while translating the second interview 
above. Merleau-Ponty consistently uses the word “vécu” while talking about 
phenomenology. In its general use, “vécu” would translate to the English word 
“experience.” However, I translated this term as “lived experience” given the particular 
use of the term within phenomenology, and the fact that the original French is also the 
past participle of the verb “vivre” (to live). The French word “expérience” is also 
generally translated as “experience” in English, although it can also mean “experiment.” 
Merleau-Ponty ends up using both of these terms together towards the end of the 
interview and it is difficult to understand exactly what the distinction is between the two 
terms. However, it is clear that all of the nuance between these French words is found in 
the words themselves, or in the broader cultural context. The nuance does not originate in 
the thought of Merleau-Ponty himself, as I am not even sure what that thought is. If 
language were the empty envelope of the rationalist and empiricist, devoid of meaning on 
its own, the complications in this translation could not be fully explained. 
We are fully submerged in language from a very early age to the point where even 
personal thoughts require an inner dialogue. If language were just an empty envelope for 
thought, there would be no need for an inner dialogue in order for us to think. But in 
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reality, a pure thought without the mediation of language is impossible to assign 
meaning; we cannot begin to think without words. The inextricable connection between 
language and thought reveals that our thoughts always tend towards expression, either 
through speech, writing, or inner dialogue. Merleau-Ponty explains further in the second 
interview: “[s]o, do you see at what point language becomes something fundamental? It 
conveys the entire world of thought. It subsumes everyone, it is the frame of ideas, it is 
the body or the frame of the mind.” (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 136). 
Merleau-Ponty once again means the phenomenal body here, taken as our active mediator 
with the world. And just as the body “is not simply one of the mind’s objects, one of the 
objects it takes an interest in and that it considers from afar,” just as “our mind is situated 
in it, in an intimate relation with it,” language is not tangentially related to thought, 
thought is situated in it (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 426-427). 
The rationalist presents language as a distinct unit from the thought, both 
governing and underlying speech. The empiricist separates language as an “objective” 
stimulus and the action on the part of the physical brain which produces “thought.” In 
contrast, Merleau-Ponty argues that language and thought are necessarily linked. Rather 
than language presupposing thought or vice versa, they “are enveloped in each other; 
sense is caught in speech, and speech is the external existence of sense” (Phenomenology 
of Perception, 187). Speech accomplishes thought as much as thought accomplishes 
speech. In both the empiricist’s and the rationalist’s accounts, language is an external 
component that is used to convey a thought, but it does not play an active role in the 
development of thought. Yet in writing this paper, for example, it is not the case that I 
know exactly what I am going to include beforehand, despite having studied the material 
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beforehand. The writing process reveals new ideas to us and clarifies concepts. It is only 
in the act of writing that I can make my general thoughts on the subject concrete. I did 
some of this work beforehand in making an outline, but even this was accomplished in 
language. It is important to see that my use of language through writing was not external 
to my thought process: it actualized it. This is also why taking notes during class is useful 
to the end of internalizing information. It may be the case that I can look back on notes 
later while studying, but the act of writing ideas down already greatly increases the 
amount of information that is internalized. And when I do look back at notes to study, the 
words themselves make a thought reappear without having to reconstruct the meaning of 
what is written in the context of the class. All of this serves as evidence that, once again, 
language itself has a sense. It is not the empty envelope of the empiricist or the 
rationalist. So why is it that we can so easily fool ourselves into separating speech and 
thought? 
The interconnectedness of language and thought as well as our understanding of 
others through speech shows us that “there is a taking up of the other person’s thought, a 
reflection in others, a power of thinking according to others” in language 
(Phenomenology of Perception, 189). And it is precisely because of this power of taking 
up another’s thought through language and language’s immediate connection with 
thought that allows us to forget about the importance of language in the process. We 
believe to be reaching another’s thought as a unit distinct from the speech that actively 
conveys the thought because language is so fundamental to “convey[ing] the entire world 
of thought… [that it] subsumes everyone” (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 136). 
Another’s speech is so readily accessible to us that it does not show up to us as the 
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intermediary between their thought and my own. And once again, just as mind and body 
are necessarily tied up with each other, language and thought cannot be separated. 
Merleau-Ponty makes a further point related to our taking up of another’s thought 
through language by making a distinction between second-order and first-order speech. 
In general, second-order speech (and thought) occurs when we take up the speech 
of another as an end in itself or when we reuse some previously worked out concept 
without reinterpretation. The first case seems to be quite rare and an existence on the 
basis of uncritical acceptance of others’ speech would be empty, much like the de 
Beauvoirian “sub-person.” Yet the second case happens daily. We might begin to think 
about this on the model of our actions, for example whenever we navigate our daily 
commute, pedal a bicycle, do our laundry and so forth. At one point, all of these activities 
had to be learned, and often are done with varying levels of thetic action. Yet each of 
these activities can quickly become so habitual as to take no critical thought. The same is 
true when it comes to our involvement with language. On a basic level, since we come 
into a world in which language has already been constituted, “we possess in ourselves 
already formed significations for all of these banal words” (Phenomenology of 
Perception, 189). Thus, importantly, second-order speech should not be seen in purely 
negative terms. In fact, constantly existing in original thought processes while traveling 
to work each day would be exhausting if not impossible.  
Furthermore, second-order speech often serves as the foundation on which more 
substantive thought takes place, just as the child needs to learn the seemingly arbitrary 
sounds of language in order to open their world to interpersonal communication through 
speech. The more substantive first-order speech still involves taking up the thinking of 
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another, but not as an end in itself as in second-order thought. Instead, it results in the 
formation of a new way to approach the world: “If authentic, speech gives rise to a new 
sense” (Phenomenology of Perception, 200). This could be something as drastic as re-
envisioning the solar system from a heliocentric perspective, or something as seemingly 
trivial as discovering that you like jazz. Copernicus’s scientific revelation obviously gives 
rise to a new sense for himself and others, but it could only happen on the foundation of 
second-order speech, in terms of rearticulating thoughts that were previously accepted 
uncritically. And while the discovery of jazz may seem unimportant, it still changes the 
way our world shows up to us in that we begin to recognize jazz being played in cafés 
where we previously heard mere background music.  
These examples make it clear that first-order speech does not have to be the first 
time that something has been articulated from a historical perspective. If you successfully 
engage with a philosophical text, and if what the writer articulates connects with you in 
such a way as to change your perspective, you are taking part in first-order speech, 
despite the concept being previously articulated by the author. First-order speech can 
even come from something that you have spoken in the past. When someone recognizes 
that they are truly in love for the first time, despite having said so to past partners, this 
fundamentally changes their perspective of their partner, of love, of the world and so 
forth. Truly meaning “I love you” can be an example of first-order speech and thought 
even if this person has truly been in love with past partners, since we learn to love our 
partners for different reasons and in different ways; as such, saying “I love you” has a 
different meaning depending on who we are are when we say it and who we say it to.  
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The most vivid example of first-order speech that I can think of is the moment 
that Helen Keller first connected with the outside world through the power of language. 
Helen Keller went deaf and blind due to an unknown disease at just nineteen months old. 
As a result, she was unable to communicate with other people and had immense trouble 
understanding the outside world: she was largely stuck in her own head. Her teacher, 
Anne Sullivan, had been attempting to teach Helen language through tapping on her hand 
in order to spell out words, but these words initially had no meaning to Helen because she 
could not connect them to the outside world. In fact, she originally thought that Sullivan 
was playing a game with her. It was not until Sullivan brought Helen to a well and 
spelled the word “water” into one hand while water flowed over the other that she really 
connected with language and the world. Helen Keller describes the moment in her 
autobiography, The Story of My Life: 
As the cool stream gushed over one hand she spelled into the other the word 
water, first slowly, then rapidly. I stood still, my whole attention fixed upon the 
motions of her fingers. Suddenly I felt a misty consciousness as of something 
forgotten–-a thrill of returning thought; and somehow the mystery of language 
was revealed to me. I knew then that ‘w-a-t-e-r’ meant the wonderful cool 
something that was flowing over my hand. That living word awakened my soul, 
gave it light, hope, joy, set it free! There were barriers still, it is true, but barriers 
that could in time be swept away (Keller, 11-12). 
 
By connecting the words she had learned with outside objects, her world was expanded 
and Helen could begin to interact with the “outside” in an immediate and brand-new way. 
So, we are seeing that language is not only a means of connecting with other people, but 
also the power of rendering the world meaningful. In a similar way, the child does not 
know an object until it has been given a name. Merleau-Ponty writes that “it is through 
expression that thought becomes our own. The designation of objects never happens after 
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recognition, it is recognition itself” (Phenomenology of Perception, 183). For Helen 
Keller, with the birth of words came immediately and inextricably the birth of a new 
world.  
 The powerful expression of first-order speech often becomes second-order, just as 
learning to navigate a new city becomes a morning commute. To help clarify these two 
terms, Merleau-Ponty makes the distinction between “a speaking speech and a spoken 
speech” (Phenomenology of Perception, 202). First-order speech would then be authentic 
self-expression while second-order speech would be a re-articulation. Yet each of these 
terms depends on the other and the two work together as our thought develops. Spoken 
speech uses what is already at hand, as if “available significations… [were] an acquired 
fortune” (Phenomenology of Perception, 203). And it is only because of these 
“acquisitions” that a more authentic form of speech is possible. As Merleau-Ponty 
explains the interplay between first and second order speech: “Such is the function 
revealed through language, which reiterates itself, depends upon itself, or that like a wave 
gathers itself together and steadies itself in order to once again throw itself beyond itself” 
(Phenomenology of Perception, 203). Language and thought become authentic only 
through the groundwork of previously worked out concepts. Copernicus could not 
imagine a heliocentric model if he were not taught and if he did not accept the geocentric 
model that others had previously articulated. It now appears that our thoughts depend on 
the previous thoughts of ourselves as well as others. On this last point, Merleau-Ponty 
considers our use of language to be a type of gesture that serves as an active intermediary 
between thought and the world. 
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 Since thought is impossible without language and since language aims at 
communication, all of our conscious experience aims at a world with others. In 
characterizing speech as a gesture, Merleau-Ponty means that speech contains a sense on 
the sole basis of the words employed, and that it is meant to communicate with others. 
For example, speech is socially conditioned in a similar way to obscene physical 
gestures. But even more than this, speech and thought have a definitively bodily 
character. Love produces butterflies in the stomach and blushing; the realization of death 
produces an embodied, helpless feeling; when giving a presentation on a subject about 
which I am not confident, I fully feel the contours of my body and vulnerably so. 
Language and thought are directly related to our embodiment in the world rather than 
toward some intellectual process of thought. Authentic thought and self-expression 
fundamentally change the way in which the world appears to us. Taking up the practice 
of rock climbing, for example, can transform the way in which a person experiences their 
possibilities when they approach a sheer rock face. A steep cliff on a hike will show up to 
the rock climber in terms of the various ways in which it could be scaled whereas it will 
show up as a blank obstacle to the average hiker. While rock-climbing is very obviously a 
gesture of the body, we often forget that speech and thought for another reified gesture 
that we undertake. And it is only through the first-order process of learning to rock climb 
that will make the cliff show up in a different way. As Merleau-Ponty writes: “[s]peech is 
a gesture, and its signification is a world” (Phenomenology of Perception, 190). Just as 
the rock-climber opens up the climbability of the rock face, in speech we open up the 
significations of the spoken world. It is on the basis of the way in which speech shapes 
our world that Merleau-Ponty declares in the third interview that “engagement has always 
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been practiced in great philosophy. It has been practiced in the form of a philosophical 
action” (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 73).  
 
Philosophy as Engaged Activity 
 Anyone who has studied philosophy has surely heard the criticism of the 
discipline as “pure theory.” The philosopher is supposedly concerned with the world of 
thought and there is no practical application of their studies. In particular, philosophy is 
clearly out of touch with reality because it is impossible to get a job with a degree in 
philosophy. In fact, this is usually the first question that comes to mind upon hearing that 
someone studies philosophy. However, as Merleau-Ponty points out in the third 
interview, this notion of engagement is full of misunderstandings “that stem from the way 
in which… engagement was introduced” (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 72).  
 Politics is often considered to be the practical application of philosophy—a notion 
that already creates a problematic divide between the two fields. Even within the realm of 
politics, theory is generally considered to be an abstraction from reality. This criticism 
seems to come out of the familiar foundation of mind-body dualism: those who criticize 
philosophy in this manner have defined “reality” as some objective state of what 
currently is. It follows from this definition that engagement requires studying what is, 
while abandoning anything that does not correspond to this “reality.” Theory would then 
be seen as a departure from “reality” because it attempts to move beyond what currently 
is. Yet the confused notion of “reality” was never justified in the first place, just as 
defining perception in terms of an “objective” world is never explained by the mind-body 
dualist. Furthermore, certain disciplines of philosophy may seek to move beyond the 
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current state of the world, but many other disciplines seek to describe our experience of 
the world, such as phenomenology. And even those which are engaging in theory still 
find their conclusion from the world and must put these conclusions to test of this world 
in order to be successful. 
 Another misunderstanding comes out of the confusion of technical works of 
philosophy. People imagine that “when we ask philosophy to be engaged, we at the same 
time recommend that it abandons its theoretical method in order to replace philosophy in 
the traditional sense with conceptual discussions” (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 
73). And yet even philosophers who were deeply concerned with engagement, like Jean-
Paul Sartre, have written very technical works that can be quite difficult to digest. The 
theoretical methods of philosophy would only be considered unimportant if, once again, 
we see theory as an abstraction from reality rather than a description of it. Furthermore, 
there is a mistaken belief that engagement is “an option between intellectual and political 
parties” (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 72). The criticism of philosophy pretends 
that it is choosing to belong to certain intellectual parties (i.e. empiricism, rationalism, 
egoism, phenomenology, existentialism, etc.) without prescribing an affiliation with 
political parties that are dealing with the “real” world. 
There is a partial truth here in that philosophers tend not to take up overtly 
political positions while writing. Simone de Beauvoir does not write that we must belong 
to the communist party in order to truly take up our freedom, but this does not mean The 
Ethics of Ambiguity is some lofty work of theory that does not correspond to the political 
world. In fact, her ethical positions naturally lead to political beliefs without explicitly 
saying so: you cannot be fully convinced by de Beauvoir’s writing and find yourself on 
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the far right of the political spectrum. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty explains in the third 
interview that even the less directly political philosophers are engaged in the world: 
“philosophers have always admitted that one could not be a philosopher without 
demonstrating certain actions. And when philosophers do not go that far, they are content 
to write books… and these books are often dedicated to action. All of the great 
philosophies contain a politics” (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 74). In fact, the 
type of theory that does not put its claims to the test of engagement, which is how many 
mistakenly identify philosophy, is not truly philosophy. 
 When asked why it was necessary to reintroduce the notion of engagement into 
philosophy, Merleau-Ponty explains that there has been an academic trend introduced 
around the turn of the century that “wanted the philosopher to express himself in theses,” 
or in purely “abstract works” (Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 74). Merleau-Ponty 
also makes this clear in the second interview when he describes the contemporary 
philosophy of Husserl’s time. After suffering a series of affronts, philosophy in the 
nineteenth century was reduced to “a kind of rhetoric” that was almost meaningless 
(Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 141). In these specific time periods, where 
philosophy is moving away from its essential connection with the world, it can make 
sense to reintroduce the notion of engagement. However, this is an anomaly in the history 
of philosophy, and the discipline has almost always been concerned with real world 
issues, from Plato’s dialogues to current times. Any study that is not concerned with 
engagement cannot be considered philosophy. As Merleau-Ponty concludes in the third 
interview: 
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Plato wrote dialogues, and today we publish theses. And from this resulted a 
particular conception of academic propriety that wants certain questions to never 
be evoked in the form that they are posed to most people. So, here is a tradition, I 
would say, that is not really philosophical. In some sense, it is somewhat 
inhuman, because it signifies that philosophy tends to become a specialty, and I 
believe that the existence of this tradition justifies at the same time the use of a 
word like engagement in order to remind the philosopher of his duty, without 
which one could say that this notion of engagement is completely novel 
(Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, 74). 
 
When it comes to the academic trend that seeks to strip philosophy of its substance, 
criticism on the basis of engagement is necessary. But we also must recognize that this 
trend is already a movement away from philosophy and that the point of criticism is to 
return to true philosophy, not to further reduce it to meaningless rhetoric. Even further 
than this historical evidence that philosophy is necessarily engaged with the world, there 
seems to be a deeper point to be made: philosophy can only be criticized as not engaging 
with the “real” world, as being pure theory, if the criticism is being levied from the point 
of view of mind-body dualism. 
 As we discovered in Merleau-Ponty’s discussion, language and speech is a kind 
of gesture. To explain this concept further, take the physical gesture of raising a hand 
during a class discussion. The gesture does not result from some combination of outside 
stimuli, such as the combination of the particular words from whoever is speaking, that 
motivates the body to raise the hand in some mechanical process. Furthermore, the sense 
of this gesture is not found purely in some thought behind it. The hand is not raised 
because I think “I should raise my hand in order to be called on.” The gesture is more 
routine than this intellectual process, and we simply raise our hand while thinking about 
what we are going to say: the gesture is made pre-reflectively. Since my body exists 
towards its tasks, it is enough to have a goal in mind—in a pre-reflective sense—for my 
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body to be put into motion. It should be clear from this that the gesture is not some blind 
process of the body, and in fact contains a sense within itself; we raise a hand for the 
purpose of indicating we have something to contribute to the class. This also makes it 
clear that gestures are characterized by their movement towards expression in an 
interpersonal world. As Merleau-Ponty explains: “[t]he sense of the gestures is not given 
but rather understood, which is to say taken up by an act of the spectator. The entire 
difficulty is to conceive of this act properly and not to confuse it with an epistemic 
operation” (Phenomenology of Perception, 190). The gesture is necessarily engaged in 
the world and with others because it can only have a sense in this world. 
 The example of raising a hand in class is obviously a gesture, both in the everyday 
use of the word and in the more technical use of Merleau-Ponty. But in talking about 
language, Merleau-Ponty affirms that speech is just as much of a gesture as any physical 
one. Speech is a particular mode of bodily action, both in terms of the physical process of 
articulation and in the embodied experience of language, as when we feel hot in response 
to being embarrassed by what someone has said to us. And just as a physical gesture 
“refers to the sensible world” that has a particular cultural background, language is made 
up of “previous acts of expression [that] establish a common world between speaking 
subjects to which current and new speech refer” (Phenomenology of Perception, 193). 
Like other gestures, speech carries a sense within itself that can only be completed by and 
with others. 
 Returning to the criticism of philosophy as unengaged, this necessary link with 
the world in language as a gesture is completely missed by critics. Any attempt at 
philosophical expression that did not aim at the world would be nonsensical, non-
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philosophical, and immediately dismissed. Even philosophers that are mostly concerned 
with the world of ideas, as in the rationalist tradition of Descartes, cannot be truly 
separated from the world of objects and real-life situations. Even as rationalism is 
presented within the Phenomenology of Perception, it is responding to a world view that 
attempts to reduce humanity to a kind of mechanical pleasure machine. While there is a 
problematic foundation on which rationalism is built, we cannot say that it is unengaged 
with the world. There is a partial truth in the rationalist’s claim that we must be more than 
material bodies as an empiricist would claim. If even the tradition that is concerned solely 
with thetic action finds a grounding in the world and attempts to characterize our 
experience, other more “concrete” traditions must be similarly engaged in the world.  
Furthermore, those who criticize the discipline of philosophy as being unengaged 
are relying on a problematic conception of language that sees a distinction between the 
words used and the pure thoughts behind these words. The philosopher would then be 
interacting with “pure theory,” as a world distinct from the “objective” reality of our 
lives. And since this distinction between a subjective and objective world is impossible, 
as Merleau-Ponty repeatedly brings out in his work, there is no “pure theory” with which 
the philosopher can engage. Philosophy may seem to be more abstract than other 
disciplines, but it cannot move towards some transcendent theory that separates itself 
from the “real” world. It seems that we are once again running into the pervasive 
paradigm of mind-body dualism in this notion of engagement. 
When we are engaged with philosophy in terms of first-order speech, we are 
fundamentally changing our world. Before reading The Phenomenology of Perception, I 
had uncritically accepted the paradigm of mind body dualism as so many do. The 
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chapters on perception, the body, motricity, sexuality, language and freedom impacted 
my being in the world, causing me to relate to each of these aspects of my life in a 
different way. The same can be said of my responses to many other philosophers I have 
encountered. Philosophy is not a departure from our reality, but rather a description of it 
as well as motivating force. And when done well, philosophy opens up new ways of 
understanding our surroundings and others, and in doing so, it underscores our situation 
as a lived situation making an open call that demands our response. 
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